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I. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
UNITED STATES AND RUSSIAN COOPERATION 
A. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze key treaties, agreements, and factors in the 
United States-Russian cooperation on issues of nuclear nonproliferation. This thesis 
reviews the emergence of key agreements such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) program and the current Bush Administration’s Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI). Furthermore, this thesis examines the main considerations, events, and issues that 
have guided the Russian-U.S. relationship on issues of nuclear nonproliferation thus far, 
and further portends what the next few years may hold regarding the joint U.S.-Russian 
efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.  
This topic is important for three primary reasons. First, after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, there was a significant lack of command, control, and security of 
former Soviet nuclear weapons, weapons-grade material, and the scientific know-how 
(i.e. the nuclear capable intelligencia). This was quickly recognized as a major issue for 
the United States and our national security, not to mention the stake the emerging nations 
of the formers Soviet Union had in ensuring that the former Soviet nuclear complex was 
secured, accounted for, and eventually dismantled.  Second, in addition to the discussions 
in the 1990s, today’s debate includes the very real nature and possibility of terrorist 
organizations procuring nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons capabilities in order for 
detonation in a large population center and/or mass destruction of essential national 
infrastructure. This issue is one of the most dynamic problems facing the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime and the United States-Russian cooperation. The historical lack 
of command and control of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal has provided for a real 
threat of nuclear proliferation to rogue states and/or terrorist organizations. Third, the 
process of cooperation between Russia and the United States has evolved under the 
framework of international cooperation and has at times been less than successful. 
Highlighting some of the impediments to successful prevention of nuclear proliferation 
will hopefully provide a coherent analysis of how the U.S.-Russian relationship can grow 
further in continuing to prevent nuclear proliferation, especially keeping nuclear weapons 
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and nuclear capable materials from falling into the hands of rogue states and non-state 
actors. Starting with an accurate assessment of recent successes and failures and 
incorporating an evaluation of both American and Russian efforts to prevent nuclear 
proliferation will aid in the formation of future nonproliferation plans while concurrently 
addressing shortcomings and possible steps to strengthen this cooperation. 
 
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
This thesis investigates major issues surrounding the United States-Russian 
cooperation on issues of nuclear nonproliferation. In addition, this thesis considers the 
many steps that have been taken to thwart nuclear proliferation thus far and analyzes 
proposed structures to continue successful prevention of nuclear proliferation. For 
example, the historical effects of the international Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and 
the current Bush Administration’s proposal of the Proliferation Security Initiative as the 
possible future of nuclear nonproliferation. A thorough analysis of the United States’ and 
Russian cooperation in order to secure, account for, and dismantle former Soviet nuclear 
weapons while working in concert with each other to globalize their cooperation is an 
indispensable facet of this thesis. The rogue nation and terrorist aspect that has pervaded 
the issue of nuclear proliferation garners a large portion of the contemporary motivation 
to exacerbate nuclear proliferation. It is, thusly, intently discussed in this thesis, as well; it 
garners a fair amount of the consideration surrounding the U.S.-Russian cooperation on 
issues of nuclear nonproliferation.   
This thesis looks to answer three major questions: (1) What are the instruments of 
U.S.-Russian Cooperation on issues of Nuclear Nonproliferation? (2) How has the United 
States and Russia effectively (or not) cooperated on issues of Nuclear Nonproliferation? 
And what does the future hold for U.S.-Russian cooperation and how does the current 
nonproliferation infrastructure support future nonproliferation efforts? The second 
question leads to supplemental questions concerning the issue of future cooperation and 
globalization of the nuclear nonproliferation effort and frameworks that the United States 
and Russia have developed over the past fifteen years. The third question looks to define 
possible future effects of current nonproliferation efforts and how these current efforts 
may lead to an expanded range of nonproliferation. The ultimate goal is to give a 
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comprehensive assessment of the contemporary U.S.-Russian cooperation on issues of 
nuclear nonproliferation while foretelling the near future of this cooperative effort and the 
possibility of globalizing these efforts to further prevent nuclear proliferation. 
 
C. BACKGROUND 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international concern over the 
lack of control, accountability, storage, and dismantlement of the Soviet Nuclear weapons 
arsenal prompted two prominent U.S. Senators, Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar 
(R-IN), to introduce their Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The initial goal 
of this program was to highlight the dire circumstances that were created when the Soviet 
Union broke up into its constituent parts. The four nuclear republics: Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine, presented the United States with a very unique 
national security, regional security, and a possible international security dilemma 
regarding nuclear proliferation. Since the inception of the CTR program in November 
1991, it has evolved to include mechanisms to address the lack of command and control 
over Soviet nuclear weapons; it instituted mechanisms to address security, accountability, 
transportation, and destruction of the Soviet nuclear arsenal; and it has initiated several 
other apparatuses to deal with the possibility of nuclear proliferation via the former 
Soviet nuclear arsenal. 
From the standpoint of U.S.-Russian cooperation, CTR provides, possibly, the 
most prevalent and significant example of this existing effort in cooperation. There are 
currently many U.S. attempts to maintain a high level of assistance to Russia (and 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the Ukraine) while ensuring that nuclear proliferation from the 
Russian stockpile does not create an international predicament. Furthermore, since the 
events of September 11, 2001, the international apprehension of terrorism has become a 
major issue of importance for most nations. This issue has consequently made the idea of 
nuclear proliferation that much more of a distressing issue with the fear of mass 
annihilation perpetrated by non-state actors. This does not negate the fact that rogue 
nations desiring a place at the nuclear bargaining table aren’t trying their best to obtain 
nuclear weapons capabilities as a major point of concern. On the contrary, the 
cooperative efforts between the United States and Russia include dialogue and action to 
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prevent nuclear proliferation of any kind while establishing the infrastructural safeguards 
to prevent any such proliferation issues in the future.  This cooperative relationship does 
not always work on a copasetic level; however, both participants see the value in keeping 
a nonproliferation dialogue open in order to prevent any nuclear proliferation in which all 
parties would be greatly affected.  
Additionally, the current Bush Administration has proposed the Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) in order to capitalize and globalize some of the Russian-U.S. 
cooperation. This initiative hopes to coordinate the nations of the world who all have a 
stake in preventing nuclear proliferation. PSI has the goal of creating a multinational 
coalition that relies on established laws and codes of the sea and international borders to 
interdict illicit shipments of nuclear weapons, fissile material, or any nuclear weapons-
capabilities. This Proliferation Security Initiative will involve global interaction and 
involvement.1 
Contained within the body of this thesis are several more examples of 
cooperation, not only between the United States and Russia, but among the international 
community. Although the U.S.-Russian cooperation has not always been easy or 
necessarily effective, it does carry with it the undeniable necessity of continued efforts to 
prevent nuclear proliferation, especially to those whose intent is not persuasion or 
dissuasion, but unadulterated terrorism and cold blooded murder. 
 
1. International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) signed on 1 July 
1968 represents the world's single most important multilateral nuclear arms control 
agreement. The NPT has the largest membership and it remains the most successful 
exemplar of arms control. Today, with 182 non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) and five 
NPT  nuclear-weapon states  (NWS), the Treaty's membership stands at 187. The number  
                                                 
1 John R. Bolton, “The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy: Successes and Future 
Change,” John R. Bolton, under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security: Testimony Before 
House International Relations Committee, Washington D.C., March 30, 2004, On-line database, available 
at:  http://www.state.gove/t/us/rm/31029.htm 
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of states with large nuclear arsenals has been contained at five. Today, only four states 
remain non-parties: Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan-however, the latter three possesses 
nuclear weapons.  
The NPT remains the only global legally binding instrument committing the NWS 
to disarm, and its indefinite extension in 1995 strengthened the global nuclear non-
proliferation norm. Responding to the most significant challenges to the NPT to date, i.e. 
the Indian nuclear detonations of May 1998 and terrorist desire to acquire nuclear 
capabilities, Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy stressed that: "The nuclear non-
proliferation regime is based on, and anchored in, international law and norms, as well as 
incorporated into international mechanisms. The NPT is fundamental, but the broader 
regime is a complex system of multilateral and bilateral agreements, arrangements and 
mechanisms intended to promote and achieve a world without nuclear weapons, sooner 
rather than later. This was valid during the Cold War and remains valid today. At the 
same time, the regime is intended to provide a framework to enable the world to make 
effective use of nuclear capability for peaceful purposes." Furthermore, the current threat 
of terrorist acquisition of nuclear capable weapons has provided a myriad of issues for the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime to ponder while meeting in New York City for the 
2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conference.  The outcome of this review 
conference could determine the viability and longevity of a coherent international policy 
towards nuclear proliferation and consequently directly affect the cooperative endeavors 
of the United States and Russian and their efforts to globalize these efforts.   
On 18 April 2005 at the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP), Ambassador 
Sergio Duarte (Brazil), President of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 2005 
Review Conference spoke at a public meeting on “Nuclear Non-proliferation in the 21st 
Century: the 2005 Review Conference and Beyond.” He stated that the almost universal 
adherence to the NPT is due to a balance of commitments, on the one hand, between the 
non-nuclear State Parties to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons without 
prejudice to the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and on the 
other hand, the nuclear weapon State Parties to achieve nuclear disarmament. “The main 
obstacles to consensus at the Review Conference do not stem from different 
interpretations of the central objective of the Treaty, but from the lack of compliance on 
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the part of the nuclear weapon State Parties.”2 In addition, there exists further doubts 
about the efficiency of safeguard systems provided by the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty after the discovery of a secret weapons program in Iraq and Libya in the early 
1990s, and more recently, North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, Iran's advanced 
nuclear program, and Al-Qaeda's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. However, this 
Treaty is still considered an indispensable centerpiece of non-proliferation and is 
conceivably the most valuable instrument to promote nuclear disarmament. This treaty 
helps to coordinate the many other arms control and threat reduction initiatives via its 
precepts, articles of compliance, and through the sheer numbers of those nations who are 
signed participants. “Ambassador Duarte urged State Parties to come forward with 
compromises if they do not wish to risk a blow to the international system of peace and 
security. The main substantive issues before the Review Conference will include: the 
reaffirmation of the “13 steps” and the “unequivocal undertaking”, agreed on in 2000, in 
order to achieve a total elimination of the nuclear arsenal; the difficult equilibrium of 
non-proliferation and the right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; 
the adoption of measures to increase accountability and transparency; the reactivation of 
the Conference on Disarmament; the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty; the preparation of effective, legally binding agreements on negative security 
assurances; and the prevention of non-state actors acquiring nuclear material.”3 
There have been mixed reviews and analysis about this NPT Conference Review. 
“While often tumultuous, previous NPT Review Conferences have enjoyed varying 
degrees of success. In the context of the upcoming debate, it is important to note that the 
most successful sessions have been products of balance—balance in addressing all three 
pillars of the treaty: nonproliferation, peaceful sharing of nuclear technology, and 
disarmament. The treaty has emerged strongest when all states have acknowledged the 
challenges to all three pillars and have made difficult compromises to address each of 
those challenges. As the President of this year’s Review Conference, Sergio Duarte of 
Brazil, has stated, we cannot “give exclusive weight to one of the elements to the 
                                                 
2 A Public Discussion with Ambassador Sergio Duarte, Nuclear Nonproliferation in the 21st Century: 




detriment of the others.”  Sometimes that strengthening has come in the form of a final 
consensus document as in 2000. Other times, it has come as a statement of principles and 
objectives as in 1995 at what is considered the most successful NPT Review Conference 
ever. The debate in New York will inevitably be framed by the three pillars, and will 
center around the six blows recently absorbed by the treaty, with the delegates searching 
for agreement on ways in which those challenges can be addressed. The most important 
development will be to what extent the member-states recognize that Universal 
Compliance and a balance of obligations must drive their thinking.”4  
 
a. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
The IAEA seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to 
inhibit its use for military purposes. United States President Eisenhower envisioned, in 
his Atoms for Peace speech before the UN General Assembly in 1953, the creation of this 
international body to control and develop the use of atomic energy. In his Atoms for 
Peace speech, President Eisenhower stated, “"It is with the book of history, and not with 
isolated pages, that the United States will ever wish to be identified. My country wants to 
be constructive, not destructive. It wants agreement, not wars, among nations. It wants 
itself to live in freedom, and in the confidence that the people of every other nation enjoy 
equally the right of choosing their own way of life…To the making of these fateful 
decisions, the United States pledges before you--and therefore before the world--its 
determination to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma--to devote its entire heart and 
mind to find the way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be 
dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."5 
 The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna, Austria (at the Vienna International 
Centre). The IAEA has 137 member states, whose representatives meet annually for the 
General Conference to elect 35 members to be included into the Board of Governors. The 
Board of Governors meets five times a year and is a consensual body which prepares 
                                                 
4 Joshua Williams and Jon Wolfsthal, The NPT at 35: A Crisis of Compliance or a Crisis of 
Confidence? This piece was originally published as a policy brief by the United Nations Association of the 
United States of America(UNA-USA). Online database, available at: 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16850 
5 Dwight D. Eisenhower, Atoms for Peace, This address was given by Dwight D. Eisenhower before 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, New York City, 
December 8, 1953, Online database, available at:  http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/atoms.htm 
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decisions to be made by the General Conference. The IAEA serves as an 
intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical co-operation in the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology. The IAEA's programs encourage the development of the peaceful 
application of nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against its misuse, 
and facilitate the application of safety measures in its use.  
The IAEA has a stake in the cooperative effort between the United States 
and Russia and continues to foster good will in their attempts at threat reduction and arms 
control. The IAEA work is based on three pillars akin to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty’s three pillars:  
1. Promoting Safeguards and Verification 
2. Promoting Safety and Security 
3. Promoting Science and Technology6 
Additionally, these three pillars coincide with various aspects, goals, and 
missions of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The IAEA’s current work with 
the former Soviet Union’s nuclear complex has been to augment what the CTR program 
has already in place while working to execute to fruition their three elements in order to 
effectively reduce the negative effect of nuclear weapons. 
 
2. Proliferation Motives 
 There are various reasons for nations, rogue states (i.e. North Korea and Iran), and 
non-state actors (i.e. Al Qaeda) to seek out nuclear capabilities. Some of these reasons are 
centered on the desire for international credibility, while others are concerned with 
regional hegemony. Sometimes proliferation has a purely monetary motive; however, 
most of the time the motivations behind proliferation are a combination of the 
aforementioned reasons. For the terrorists, most often their desire to attain nuclear 
weapons is to detonate them in order to maximize casualties. For rogue states, such as 
North Korea, their desires are more nebulous. Often they desire to attain nuclear 
capabilities in order to enhance their international credibility while serving to destabilize 
                                                 
6 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Pillars of Nuclear Cooperation,” Online database, available 
at:  http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/index.html 
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the region in which they reside in order to gain perceived military legitimacy.  Rogue 
states often do this with the goal of affecting regional politics to meet their ends. 
Unfortunately, there is, all too often, a supplier of nuclear capabilities for those who are 
demanding. This is precisely why the continued cooperative effort between Russia and 
the United States has such an important global and regional effect. The successful 
continued cooperation between the United States and Russia to secure, account for, and 
dismantle the Russian nuclear complex to include their extensive nuclear “know-how” 
and vast stockpiles of fissile material will continue to be a mission of utmost importance 
for the United States and consequently, the world. 
 
Figure 1.   Global Nuclear Status7 
                                                 
7 Rodney W. Jones and Mark G. McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and 
Charts, Available online, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tracking_Ch01map1.pdf 
This map portrays the World Nuclear Status as of 1998. It shows the possible perpetrators of nuclear 
proliferation, as well as the five nuclear weapons states. 
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This map shows the gradation between the five declared nuclear weapons states (NWS), 
the many non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), and the states of concern that are 
considered to be actively searching for nuclear weapons capabilities. As mentioned, the 
reasons for nuclear proliferation vary, but as the concept of supply and demand affects 
market economies, it too, affects the motivation behind nuclear proliferation. 
 
D. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Chapter I: 
The essence of chapter one is the explanation of the validity of this thesis. 
Furthermore, chapter one provides the major questions and structure of this thesis. There 
are some broad historical assessments of the U.S.-Russian cooperation and subsequently 
the international cooperation aspect. Chapter one includes a detailed outline of this thesis.  
 
Chapter II: 
Chapter II provides a descriptive account of the many tools and entities that have 
been devised in order to counter-act nuclear proliferation. This chapter provides a brief 
synopsis of the major factors that encompass the cooperative effort between Russia and 
the United States.  
 
Chapter III: 
      Chapter III is primarily concerned with the assessment of the United States’ 
efforts in coordinating a coherent strategy to combat nuclear proliferation and their many 
endeavors to maintain a high level of cooperation with Russia and the former nuclear 
republics of the Soviet Union. The design of this chapter includes a brief historical 
summary of each cooperative effort followed by an assessment of the current situation. 
The end of this chapter includes the current Bush Administration’s near term goals for 
strengthening the cooperation between Russia and the United States in order to foster a 






Chapter IV is the assessment of Russia’s attempts at curbing nuclear proliferation. 
This chapter includes a very detailed, yet brief, accounting of the success or lack thereof, 
of selected cooperative threat reduction and nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia. 
Additionally, chapter five has information gleaned from an interview with Dr. Siegfried 
Hecker, the former Director of the Los Alamos Nuclear Research Laboratory, regarding 
his assessment of how effective the United States and Russia are cooperating. 
 
Chapter V: 
Chapter V is the conclusion. This chapter is a synthesis of all the information 
contained herein, and it includes some future plans and possibilities to strengthen U.S.-
Russian cooperation and eventually the globalization of a cooperative threat reduction 
and nuclear nonproliferation program. 
 
E. EXISTING LITERATURE 
This topic, comparatively, is quite contemporary; thusly there is a multitude of 
information and resources available electronically on the internet. Additionally, there are 
several renowned scholars who have examined the issues surrounding nuclear 
proliferation and have written books or chapters in books. The U.S. Department of State 
has an extensive archive of information, resources, speeches, and documents that have 
been quite useful in my research. On the other hand, researching the cooperative effort 
between the United States and Russia from the Russian perspective has been so not as 
easy as the reverse. Locating pertinent and time appropriate sources was difficult, not to 
mentions the possible language barrier. However, I was fortunate enough to attend a 
symposium held at Stanford University in April 2005 titled, “From Russia with Love: the 
Post-Soviet U.S. Russian Nuclear Cooperation.” This symposium was delivered by Dr. 
Siegfried Hecker, the former Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory. I was also 
able to interview Dr. Hecker a couple of days later to inquire about his insight into the 
U.S.-Russian cooperation on issues of nuclear nonproliferation from the Russian 
perspective. The information he provided was quite valuable and featured in chapter five 
of this thesis. There are not too many book sources for the contemporary nature of this 
12 
thesis, and for what books do exist, often chapters of these books exist as articles in topic 
pertinent publications available on the internet.   
The following is a list of internet sites, available books, and articles relating to 
threat reduction. This is not a comprehensive list, but it will indicate to some degree what 
I used as resources and what exists for research of this topic. As well, there is a 
comprehensive bibliography containing the sources  used to include several internet sites, 
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II. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: UNITED STATES AND 
RUSSIAN COOPERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The safety, security, and accountability of nuclear weapons in the republics of the 
former Soviet Union have been cause for increasing concerns for the security of the 
United States, as well, for the security of Russia since the break up of the Soviet Union in 
December 1991. The issue of nuclear nonproliferation has become a cornerstone of 
diplomacy, aid, and cooperation between the four nuclear-capable republics of the former 
Soviet Union and the United States. The current cooperation between the United States, 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan on issues of nuclear nonproliferation and the 
security of weapons facilities and fissile material is diverse and continually evolving. 
Moreover, since the events of September 11, 2001, the need to ensure nuclear weapons 
and fissile material accountability and security has taken on a more necessary 
temperament within the boundaries of American-Russian cooperation and equally, on the 
global scope of nuclear proliferation.  
In 1997, retired Russian Gen. Alexander Lebed announced that at the time of the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost track of more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear 
weapons.8 In October 2001, U.S. intelligence sources received a report that terrorists had 
acquired a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb and were planning to smuggle it into Manhattan.9 
Auspiciously, both these reports turned out to be false and were deemed to be lacking 
sufficient evidence but did provide enough concern for the United States government to 
seriously consider the ramifications of a catastrophic detonation of a nuclear devise in a 
populated center. Furthermore, these events illuminated the frightening reality that, at the 
time, the U.S. could not dismiss the possibility that these reports were true; such events 
could indeed happen. The stark reality that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inherently accounts for the possibility that they 
                                                 
8 Gen Alexander Lebed: “Small Nuclear Weapons May Be in Wrong Hands." CNN.com, October 1, 
1997, Online Database, available at:  http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9710/01/russia.lebed/ 
9 Mathew Bunn, Anthony Weir, and John Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials, 
(Washington, DC: Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard University, 
March 2003), pp. 18. 
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might fall into the hands of a terrorist groups with the intent to detonate such a weapon in 
a densely populated area. This would undoubtedly have a catastrophic effect. However, 
the international community has acknowledged this insidious threat, and in particular, the 
United States and Russia have blazed a clear path of cooperation in order to prevent such 
a terrorist threat from materializing while effectively securing, accounting for, and 
dismantling the former Soviet nuclear arsenal.  
There have been several arms control, threat reduction, and nonproliferation 
measures that have been established since the inception of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, 
there have been significant advances in cooperation among many of the integral nuclear 
capable nations since the breakup of the Soviet Union. The intense concern with the 
general lack of command and control over the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons 
arsenal, the fissile material that was left behind after the Soviet Union’s breakup, and the 
technical expertise of the Soviet scientists all combine to create a precarious and possibly 
volatile global circumstance. This circumstance has provided more than sufficient 
impetus for the concerned nations of the world, and in particular the United States, 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, to cooperate to eliminate the threat of nuclear 
weapons proliferation and, consequently, augment their own national security. 
 
B. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION (CTR) PROGRAM 
The U.S. Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) Program in November 1991 to address the growing concern with the crumbling 
state of the Soviet Union and its inability to effectively control its nuclear arsenal and all 
associated material. “A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent 
disintegration of the Soviet Union ... raised concerns about the safety and security of 
Soviet nuclear weapons.”10 The goal of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
Program is to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in controlling and protecting 
their nuclear weapons, weapons-usable materials, and delivery systems. Furthermore, to 
aid in the implementation of several arms control agreements, CTR also contributes to the 
dismantling and destruction of a number of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery 
systems. “In the 1990s, the U.S. Congress initially allocated from the defense budget 
                                                 
10 Amy F. Woolf, “Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress,” CRS 
Report for Congress, On-line Database, available at:  http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/97-1027.pdf 
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approximately $400 million each year to CTR-related programs; which are now 
administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), 
Department of Commerce, and the Department of State.  From 2000-2010, the United 
States will spend a projected $1 billion per year on the program.  Projects of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program have included strategic offensive arms 
elimination; nuclear warhead dismantlement; nuclear weapons storage security; chemical 
weapons destruction; biological weapons proliferation prevention; reactor core 
conversions; nuclear material protection, control and accounting; export control 
initiatives, and defense conversions.”11 The current funding for the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program as provided for by the United States Congress is depicted in the 
following table: 
 
Table 1. CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization ($ millions)12 
 
What is not related clearly in this table is the transference of the Material 
Protection Control and Accounting to the Department of Energy’s budget and its removal 
from the Department of Defense’s budget in fiscal year 2001. Additionally, the 
Department of State began to incorporate certain aspects of the Cooperative Threat 
Reduction program into its budget which in turn allowed for more total money to be 
                                                 
11 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), “The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program,  
An Overview, On-line Database, available at: 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm 
12 Amy F. Wolff, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former 
Soviet Union,” CRS Report for Congress, code RL31957, updated 15 April 2005. 
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budgeted for the CTR program with the Department of Defense not having sole fiscal 
responsibility. Funding from the State Department and the Department of Energy has 
increased yearly as they fully incorporate their particular CTR aspects into their 
budgeting fold. 
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is named for 
Senators Sam Nunn [D-GA] and Richard Lugar [R-IN]) and began in 1991 as a piece of 
US legislation entitled "The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991.” “This 
initiative stemmed from the Soviet head of state, Mikhail Gorbachev’s request for 
assistance in dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and U.S. President George Bush’s 
subsequent proposal to assist in the implementation of control, dismantlement, and 
destruction of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act, Congress noted that aid to the Soviet Union and its potential successor 
states would be in the national security interest of the United States as a means to address 
the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation.”13  
In October 1993, the Nunn-Lugar initiative became the “Cooperative Threat 
Reduction Act of 1993” and established these five criteria: 
1. Warhead removal from Soviet Successor States to Russia. 
2. Destruction and dismantlement of weapons systems. 
3. Chain of custody projects. 
4. Chemical Weapons destruction assistance. 
5. Demilitarization support.14 
The CTR Program has evolved in three phases. The first phase, from 1992-93, 
established the program, developed a practicable framework, and began early assistance 
to the Newly Independent States (NIS). Stage two, from 1994-95, implemented 
agreements, developed a management structure, and devised an acquisition strategy. 
Stage three began in 1996 and was planned as a “multi-year strategy” in order to 
                                                 
13 F. Wolff, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet 
Union,” CRS Report for Congress, code RL31957, updated 15 April 2005.. 
14 “Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993,” National Defense Authorization Act FY1994, H.R. 




complete the stated agreements. In FY96 changes in structural framework and stricter 
oversight and funding responsibilities were recommended. The resulting effect was that 
the Department of Energy (DoE) would take control of the “material control and 
accounting” projects, the State Department would handle all the International Science and 
Technology (ISTC) programs, and the Department of Commerce (DoC) would 
coordinate export control issues.15 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has essentially three distinct projects 
that define the CTR’s goals of securing, accounting, and dismantling the former Soviet 
nuclear weapons. These three projects are: chain of custody, destruction and dismantling, 
and demilitarization. 
 
1. Chain of Custody 
“Chain of custody activities are those designed to enhance safety, security, and 
control over nuclear weapons and fissile material.”16 The issues that chain of custody is 
most interested in are: transportation security, weapons storage security, and fissile 
materials storage security. After the breakup of the Soviet Union there were thousands of 
nuclear weapons spread among a few of the Newly Independent States (NIS): Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, 
Russian and U.S. cooperation has allowed the United States to aid Russia in transporting 
these weapons from the NIS by providing funding, armored blankets to protect the 
weapons from attack, storage containers to hold weapons during transit, and assistance to 
help secure roadways and trains for transportation. There are several CTR projects that 
are designed to aid Russia in improving weapons storage security. This includes U.S. 
DoD providing perimeter fencing, security upgrades at railway transfer points and 
ultimate storage facilities, and extensive accounting practices for the entire transportation 
evolution. Between FY1995 and FY2004, DoD appropriated around $450 million for 
weapons storage security.17 “According to unclassified estimates, Russia inherited more 
                                                 
15 CTR Forecast to Industry, 2/96; and “Nunn-Lugar programs being Moved to DoE, Commerce, State 
Department,” Post-Soviet Nuclear and Defense Monitor, 14 March 1995, pp. 4. 
16 Amy F. Woolf, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former 
Soviet Union,” CRS Report for Congress, 12 January 2005, pp. 11, On-line Database, available at:  
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/97-1027.pdf 
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than 30,000 nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union, along with enough plutonium and 
highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce thousands more warheads.”18 This created a 
problem when these weapons were broken down. The CTR has implemented several 
precautions to safeguard fissile material storages. The United States has provided more 
than 26,000 containers to hold fissile material; U.S. has helped Russia to build a highly 
secure storage facility at Mayak which was designed to house over 25,000 containers 
which is the equivalent to 25,000 warheads.19 This cooperative effort currently continues 
and allows the United States to continue aiding Russia as they seek ways to bolster 
accountability, security, and ultimately dismantlement of the inherited nuclear arsenal.  
The following tables highlight the budgeted money for transportation security 
(Table 2) and fissile material storage (Table 3). 
 
Table 2. CTR Funding for Transportation Security ($ millions)20 
 
 
                                                 
17 Matthew Bunn, et al., Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action 
Plan, Project on Managing the Atom, 4 March 2003. 
18 Amy F. Woolf, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former 
Soviet Union,” CRS Report for Congress, 12 January 2005, pp. 14, On-line Database, available at:  
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/97-1027.pdf 
19 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, Testimony of 
Lisa Bronson, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, 
10 March 2004 
20 Matthew Bunn, et al., Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action 
Plan, Project on Managing the Atom, 4 March 2003. 
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Table 3. CTR Funding for Fissile Material Storage ($ millions)21 
 
There has been a significant amount of funding provided for these programs over 
the course of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. However, there are some 
differing opinions concerning the near term budgeting for the various entities of the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program. For example, Brain Debose, a journalist for the 
Washington Times newspaper, stated in February 2005 that “Democrats were also 
concerned $46 million would be cut from the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to 
find and secure nuclear arms material.”22 Furthermore, the “administration’s 2005 budget 
requested only $919 million for Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to 
carry out this important work [dismantling nuclear weapons and securing or destroying 
nuclear weapons material], $72 million less than the year before. By contrast, the 
administration is still lavishing $10 billion per year on a missile defense program that 
couldn’t even get an interceptor missile out of its silo in a test in early December.”23 
 
2. Destruction, Dismantlement, and Demilitarization 
“When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, it had more than 11,000 warheads 
deployed on nearly 1,400 ICBMs, 940 SLBMs, and 162 heavy bombers. According to the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as of July 2004, CTR has helped to deactivate more 
                                                 
21 Amy F. Wolff, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former 
Soviet Union,” CRS Report for Congress, code RL31957, updated 15 April 2005. 
22 Brian Debose, “Big Cuts expected in Bush’s 2006 budget Blueprint,” The Washington Times, 7 
February 2005, Accessed via LexisNexis 27 April 2005.  
23 Michelle Ciarrocca and William D. Hartung, “Cuts May Stop Bush from Invading Iran,” The Seattle 
Post-Intelligencer, 9 February 2005, Accessed via LexisNexis 27 April 2005. 
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than 6,300 warheads, 539 ICBMs, 496 SLBMs, and 130 heavy bombers.”24 The U.S. has 
provided crucial aid to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in order to eliminate 
strategic offensive arms. By means of this aid, Belarus and Kazakhstan are free of the 
infrastructures and launchers associated with strategic nuclear weapons. The U.S. is still 
working with Russia and Ukraine in helping to dismantle and demilitarize their strategic 
arsenal.  
The current issues for the party nations are centered on meeting agreement goals, 
but include maintaining access, transparency, and increasing the global effort in 
internationalizing this cooperation. The U.S. congress has noted that the “primary barrier 
to successful implementation remains the need to gain access and transparency from 
officials in the recipient nations, particularly Russia.”25 Although Russia has made the 
process of securing weapons storages difficult and has interests in protecting its secret 
details about its nuclear weapons program, the United States does not have a “systematic 
approach to identifying and addressing these problems.”26 This issue may be the basis for 
an impasse in this cooperative effort and, furthermore, may hinder the future successful 
execution of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and all the other threat reduction, 
arms elimination, and global nuclear nonproliferation prevention programs. 
“There is near-universal agreement, both within the Bush Administration and 
among analysts outside the U.S. government, that the potential proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction to rogue nations or terrorist groups presents a global problem that 
requires an international response.”27 Understanding that the nuclear legacy of the former 
Soviet Union has created the largest and most immediate threat is keenly important, 
however, to get fixated on the notion that the Soviet legacy is the only real threat and that 
                                                 
24 Amy F. Woolf, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former 
Soviet Union,” CRS Report for Congress, 12 January 2005, pp. 14, On-line Database, available at:  
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/97-1027.pdf 
25 Ibid, pp. 39. 
26 “Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, November 
2002, pp. 4. 
27 Amy F. Woolf, “Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former 
Soviet Union,” CRS Report for Congress, 12 January 2005, pp.  44. On-line Database, available at:  
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/97-1027.pdf 
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the United States is the only nation with a vested interest would be naïve.28 There are 
three major characteristics of proposals for the internationalization of threat reduction and 
nonproliferation assistance: 
1. The G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction is a 
movement to expand the list of donors to threat reduction and 
nonproliferation assistance programs. 
• This partnership involves the G-8 nations in a financial 
obligation over the next ten years for threat reduction and 
nonproliferation assistance initially in Russia; however, 
extending this obligation to other nations is planned once 
guidelines are refined and adopted. 
2. Extending the Cooperative Threat Reduction program beyond the former 
Soviet Union 
• There is a debate in the U.S. Congress on the efficacy of 
extending CTR to other nations. Supporters believe that the 
U.S. could apply the model of CTR that has been developed 
over the past 14 years to other nations that may pose a risk of 
nuclear proliferation by helping to secure and eliminate 
weapons or material that may prove to be attractive to terrorists. 
Detractors claim that nations might not be willing to allow the 
United States access to their facilities, and furthermore, those 
who question extending CTR raise the issue of whether it is 
legal to do so under U.S. and international law for nations who 
are not parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
(i.e. Israel, Pakistan, and India).29 
                                                 
28 According to former Senator Same Nunn, “some 20 tons of civilian HEU (highly enriched uranium) 
exists at 345 civilian research facilities in 58 countries, yet there are no international standards for securing 
these nuclear materials within a country.” Sam Nunn, Co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
Reducing the Threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction and building a Global Coalition Against 
Catastrophic Terrorism. Moscow, Russia. 27 May 2002. 
29 Sharon Squassoni, “Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan,” CRS Report for 
Congress( CRS RL31589), 5 May 2003 
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3. Global Recognition of National Responsibility. 
• The goal with this approach is not necessarily more 
appropriations for threat reduction and nonproliferation 
assistance, but rather a global awareness for other nations who 
may have Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This 
approach encompasses the possible shift from the original 
concern being nuclear proliferation by means of loss of control 
and lack of security to concerns over the potential acquisition of 
WMDs by terrorist. The hope is for a “growing sense of global 
cooperation in identifying and addressing weaknesses in a 
greater number of countries.”30 
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has many facets 
that make it a viable option for U.S.-Russian cooperation on issues of nuclear 
nonproliferation; however, there are some that question the CTR’s efficacy in enhancing 
the U.S. and/or Russian national security. These critics highlight the many other treaties 
and agreements that have been established to effectively control, secure, and eventually 
eliminate nuclear weapons. Those treaties are considered to be part of an International 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime that is comprised of several nations. Some of the 
treaties associated with the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime are:  
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaties (START I/II/III); Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 
(SORT); Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT); and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). 
Through the implementation of these treaties and agreements there has been 
significant gains in reducing the nuclear threat, however, the issue of nuclear proliferation 
regarding terrorists’ acquisition of such weapons is a serious concern that has been 
directly attended to via the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.  However, it is 
important to note that the interaction of all these aforementioned treaties and agreements 
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work in concert to eventually eliminate the concept of nuclear proliferation on a global 
scale. 
 
C. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
The United States has long been the leader of an “international regime that 
attempts to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons. The centerpiece of this regime is the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970; it was 
extended indefinitely in 1995.”31 The NPT requires that the five nuclear weapons states, 
Russia, United States, China, Britain, and France, be the leaders in banning the 
acquisition and transfer of nuclear weapons in the international arena. There are currently 
190 signatories to the NPT. India and Pakistan remain outside the Treaty and Israel has 
maintained a high level of secrecy concerning their nuclear capabilities, although it is 
widely known that they have nuclear weapons. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but 
in January 2003 announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty.32 Several countries, 
including Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa suspended their nuclear programs and 
joined the NPT in the 1960s. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine handed over their nuclear 
weapons, which were remnants of the Soviet Union, to Russia and joined the NPT in the 
1990s. This action in collaboration with the CTR Program has removed a significant 
amount of nuclear capabilities from these former Soviet Republics and prevented the post 
1989-90 collapsed command and control structures from allowing these weapons to fall 
into the hands of terrorist group(s) or rogue state(s).  
Nations that signed onto the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) pledged 
not to pursue nuclear weapons in exchange for a pledge by the nuclear weapons states 
(NWS) not to assist in the development of nuclear weapons with any NNWS and to 
facilitate “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and 
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.”33  
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Although the NPT has made successful gains in the former Soviet Union, many 
regional issues have emerged that are cause for great concern. North Korea, a former 
signatory to the NPT renounced it support and continued its pursuit of nuclear weapons in 
defiance of the treaty. Iran, an NPT signatory, is suspected of pursuing nuclear weapons 
technology. “The tension between India and Pakistan is made more dangerous by their 
possession of nuclear explosives. There is concern about Chinese and Russian activities 
that may encourage proliferation in other regions.” 34 Although these regional concerns 
are tended to by the International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, the reality of a rogue 
state (in the case of North Korea and Iran) and the possible acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and/or weapons-useable material via the Pakistani “AQ Kahn network” are very 
real situations and further exemplify the need for continued cooperation between Russia 
and the United States to prevent any transference of information, material, and technical 
expertise to such situations.  
A major illustration of the failure of the International Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime to prevent the spreading of information and materials has been epitomized by the 
AQ Khan Nuclear Proliferation Network. “During the 1990s, there were intermittent 
clues from intelligence [agencies] that AQ Khan was discussing the sale of nuclear 
technology to countries of concern. By early 2000, intelligence revealed that these were 
not isolated incidents. It became clear that Khan was at the centre of an international 
proliferation network. By April 2000, the UK Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was 
noting that there was an evolving, and as yet incomplete, picture of the supply of uranium 
enrichment equipment to at least one customer in the Middle East, thought to be Libya, 
and evidence linking this activity to Khan.”35 AQ Khan’s “nuclear” aid to Iran, Libya, 
and North Korea has been well documented and further supports the need for continued 
cooperation in the international community with Russia and the United States providing 
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D. STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATIES (START I/II) 
The goal of preventing nuclear proliferation by means of cooperation between 
Russia and the U.S. has another element that may not be as apparently nonproliferation 
oriented, but remains a cornerstone to the cooperation effort and has some viable effects 
regarding the prevention of nuclear proliferation. One example of this cooperation and 
the effecting arms reduction is the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I, a.k.a.: 
The Lisbon Protocol). The START I was signed 1 July 1991 by Russia and the United 
States. It was originally designed to have a 15 year duration, but at the Helsinki Summit 
in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin tried to reach an agreement to extend the duration 
indefinitely. However, that has yet to be completely negotiated. “The treaty limits the 
total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for United States and Russia to 1,600 
each, the total number of accountable warheads to 6,000 each, total number of warheads 
mounted on ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) to 4,900 each,  and the total number 
of warheads mounted on mobile ICBMs to 1,100 each.”36 Additionally, the START I 
Treaty contained extensive provisions for oversight and monitoring. After the breakup of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991, the START I Treaty obligated the nuclear-capable 
Soviet republics; Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to accede to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapon states after removing all nuclear 
capabilities from their borders. This effectively made Russia the only nuclear state left 
over from the Soviet Union.  
The START II Treaty is primarily an extension of the START I, however, there 
are some further restrictions to the number of nuclear weapons either side can have. For 
example, “START II establishes a limit on strategic weapons for each party, with 
reductions to be implemented in two phases. By the end of Phase I, the United States and 
Russia are to reduce their total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250, 
including no more than 2,160 warheads deployed on SLBMs, no more than 650 on heavy 
ICBMs, and no more than 1700-1750 on SLBMs. By the end of Phase II, each party's 
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total number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads may not exceed 3,000-3,500. Of this 
number, no more than 1,700-1,750 may be deployed on SLBMs.”37  
The START Treaties further emphasize the desire of all parties to maintain a 
healthy cooperation in the effort to reduce nuclear arms while effectively acting to 
prevent nuclear proliferation in a regional as well as on a global level. Another such tool 
that has been negotiated and enacted is the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). 
 
E. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE REDUCTION TREATY (SORT) 
The Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) is also known as the Moscow 
Treaty. It was signed by both Russia and the United States in Moscow on 24 May 2002. 
This treaty obligates the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce the total 
number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level not to exceed 1,700-2,200 for 
each nation. In contrast to earlier strategic arms control treaties (START I & II), it places 
no restrictions on the composition of individual components of Russian and American 
nuclear triads, with the exception of reaffirming the restrictions introduced in the START 
I treaty. The treaty also does not require either country to eliminate any nuclear warheads 
or delivery vehicles, and introduces no new verification provisions beyond that already in 
existence with the START treaties. SORT is to remain in force until 31 December 2012, 
but can be extended if both nations agree. The SORT, much like the START treaties is 
another affirmation of the Russian-American cooperation in reducing the global effect of 
nuclear weapons. Although this formalized function for reduction does not explicitly 
address nuclear nonproliferation, it inherently provides the safeguards necessary to 
prevent material and weapons from falling into the wrong hands. Additionally, it provides 
another example of the importance of reducing nuclear warheads in order to comply with 
Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. 
 
F. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a product of the current Bush 
Administration. PSI works primarily as a diplomatic tool that the “United States has used 
to gain support for interdicting shipments of weapons of mass destruction-related (WMD) 
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equipment and materials.”38 The Bush Administration has emphasized that PSI is an 
activity rather than an organization. This amorphous activity is well suited for the rapid 
and often changing issue concerning nuclear proliferation. Currently there are 16 nations 
that have pledged their support. These “core members” agreed in Paris 2003 to accept a 
set of interdicting principles. The goal of these principles is to “create a web of 
counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have difficulty carrying 
out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology.” Due in part to the PSI, the 
United Nations Security Council, in April of 2004, adopted UNSC Resolution 1540, 
which effectively required all states to criminalize proliferation, enact strict export 
controls and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.39 The ultimate goal of PSI 
is to foster global coordination to prevent nuclear proliferation. A major aspect to this 
effort is the Russian-U.S. relationship and the perception that this relationship carries 
globally. The more validity this initiative can garner, the more effective it will become. 
 
G. CONCLUSION 
Cooperation between Russia and the United States has been a very important 
aspect to the global effort of preventing nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, the many 
established agreements and treaties offer a solid foundation from which future 
cooperation can be fostered in good faith. Although there are some incongruent 
approaches, the overall goal of nuclear nonproliferation remains a major issue for Russia 
and the United States. 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program is the current benchmark of 
Russian-American cooperation. The necessity in 1991 for oversight, aid, and cooperation 
with and for the republics of the collapsing Soviet Union has paid major dividends, 
especially in the wake of the events of September 11, 2001. The reality that the paradigm 
of the traditional nuclear threat has shifted to one of much more sinister and insidious 
execution has been a natural transition for the safeguards and protocols of the CTR. 
Moreover, the CTR works in coordination with many other treaties and agreements that 
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not only work to prevent nuclear proliferation, but actively implement established means 
to reduce global nuclear weapons numbers while increasing the security, accounting, 
dismantlement, and demilitarization of such weapons. The Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, 
and the Proliferation Security Initiative are great examples of the means by which Russia 
and the United States have fostered cooperation, not only with each other, but expanding 
cooperation to include the international community. Russian-American cooperation on 
issues of nuclear nonproliferation is a valuable exercise in strengthening each other’s 
national security while effectively reducing the potentially catastrophic effects of nuclear 





















III. ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED STATES' STRATEGY AND 
COOPERATION ON ISSUES OF NUCLEAR 
NONPROLIFERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States is an active and leading member in a transnational organization 
called the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. This regime is comprised of the members in 
the international community to include many individual states. The regime’s main goal is 
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and their worldwide effect through strategic 
deterrence of the availability and proliferation of nuclear weapons to states and non-state 
actors. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime is comprised of and exercises its control via 
a range of laws, treaties, and agreements. The main facet of the nonproliferation 
movement has been the “Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the terms of the 
NPT, the five declared nuclear weapons states — the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Russia, France and China — agreed “not in any way to assist” any non-weapons state to 
acquire nuclear weapons. They also agreed to reduce and eventually eliminate their own 
nuclear arsenals. Non-weapons states agreed not to develop nuclear weapons and to allow 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect their nuclear facilities and 
materials to ensure that peaceful nuclear technology is not diverted to military 
purposes.”40 Non-weapon states, via the NPT, are also guaranteed access to peaceful 
nuclear technology. “Since the end of the Cold War, participation in the NPT has been 
almost universal; except for India and Pakistan, whose pursuit of nuclear weapons 
capabilities combined with the 1998 tests of nuclear explosives comprise a principal 
nonproliferation concern, only Israel has not signed the NPT.”41 However, with the 
surprising and tragic events of September 11, 2001, a new feature of nuclear 
nonproliferation has emerged as a significant issue to be dealt with by the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime. The United States has taken the international lead in many 
respects concerning the prevention of terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass 
destruction (primarily nuclear in this case) and have acted with a sense of urgency to 
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keep non-nuclear states from making the transition to nuclear capable. Each previous 
presidential administration has left an indelible mark in the realm of nonproliferation, 
however, the Bush Administration’s achievements in nuclear nonproliferation and the 
events of September 11th may be the most significant due to the gravity of possibly 
having to deal with non-state actors with nuclear capabilities and embracing nations who 
desire to be nuclear capable. 
The terrible attacks that occurred on 9/11 have emphasized some very significant 
aspects regarding the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and their primary concern being 
terrorists’ acquisition of a nuclear weapon and the subsequent detonation of same in a 
populated area. Currently, one of the main goals of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 
is to prevent such an occurrence. This is not to forsake the many other important issues 
concerning nonproliferation. There are a multitude of imperative issues surrounding the 
concept of nonproliferation; for example, regional issues such as the Democratic 
Republic of Korea’s (North Korea) attempts to weaponize fissile material; the Iranian 
attempt to jump start their nuclear research and development program; and the continuing 
Pakistani/Indian conflict, which has become even more tenuous with the introduction of 
nuclear capabilities by both nations. All these issues are extremely important and are the 
source of consternation and political wrangling.  
The issues surrounding nuclear nonproliferation are extensive, diverse, and 
tremendously disconcerting. One of the key aspects to the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation is how the various world leaders address the issue and how successful they 
are in doing so. The United States has been a constant and leading force in the area of 
nuclear nonproliferation. There are several measures that encapsulate the success or the 
attempt to succeed in the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation. The primary 
measures that are widely employed in the attempts to prevent nuclear weapons 
proliferation generally are agreements and treaties. This chapter will focus primarily on 
the success (or the lack thereof success) the Bush Administration has had with nuclear 
nonproliferation by analyzing their support and advancement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty (ABM Treaty), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). After analyzing 
the Bush Administrations use and expansion of these four treaties and initiatives we will 
35 
have gained a better understanding of how effective this administration has been and how 
effective they may be in the coming four years. 
 
B. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY (ABM) 
1. History 
The Anti-Ballistic Treaty (ABM) was a treaty between the former Soviet Union 
and the United States concerning limitations on anti-ballistic systems used primarily for 
defending areas against nuclear warhead ballistic missiles. The particulars of the 
agreement were such that the limitations placed upon the employment of anti-ballistic 
missiles were to limit the capability of either nation from providing, utilizing, or 
developing a nationwide anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). The early history of the US 
ABM endeavor began in the 1950s when the United States began to develop a series of 
missiles that had the ability to shoot down incoming Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs). Since the US had a significant lead in equipment and production of such 
technology during this period, the determination was that an ABM system could limit the 
overall catastrophic damage associated with a full scale nuclear exchange. This 
eventually led to the creation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) in 
conjunction with Canada. The debate about the feasibility and force posture it presented 
to the Soviet Union became a focal point in public and political discourse. The concern 
was that if the system did work, then the Soviet’s best course of action would be to 
immediately launch a full scale attack before the system became completely operational. 
However, during this debate, the concept of an ABM system became essentially 
disputable based on the advent of new ICBM technology of the Soviets called the MIRV 
system. The object of the MIRV ICBMs was to overwhelm any sort of ABM system with 
sheer numbers. The MIRV system was capable of delivering several nuclear warheads 
with a single ICBM. The Soviet Union and the United States eventually reached strategic 
parity in terms of ICBM forces. No longer was the issue of an ABM system a 
controversial point based on the theory that the USSR would be devastated and the 
United States would be spared in a nuclear exchange. All these new developments 
culminated in conceptualization of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), in which 
changes in the nuclear balance had to be carefully weighed and ABMs appeared far too 
36 
risky a proposition. It now appeared that having no defense was safer than one that may 
set off a nuclear war. As resulted of all these happenings, the US and USSR entered into 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This treaty was agreed to in Moscow in May 1972 and 
ratified by the US Senate in August 1972. The ABM Treaty was viewed by many as the   
key agreement on nuclear arms control because it brought to the foreground the implicit 
notion that nuclear balance need to be maintained because there was now no assurance 
that either side could consider itself immune from nuclear attack or retaliation. 
The ABM Treaty was left undisturbed until the Reagan Administration announced 
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1982. Reagan stated that “SDI was 
consistent with…the ABM Treaty” and he viewed SDI as a defensive system that would 
help to reduce the possibility of mutually assured destruction becoming a reality.42 The 
Soviet leadership viewed Reagan’s SDI as a possible source for unleashing nuclear war 
and viewed it as “not just irresponsible… [But] insane.”43 The next major milestone in 
the lifespan of the ABM Treaty was the fall of the Iron Curtain. After the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in December 1991, the solvency of the ABM Treaty was in question 
and was a topic that received much attention from scholars and politicians alike. 
Acknowledging the significance of this treaty and what it stood for, the United States and 
four of the former Soviet Republics signed a memorandum of understanding in 1997 that 
ultimately was not presented to Congress by President Clinton for ratification.44 In 
December 2001, President George W. Bush, in accordance with the provisions of the 
ABM Treaty that requires a six month notice before withdrawing from the treaty, gave 
notice to Russia that the United States was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty. This marked the first time in recent history that the US had withdrawn from a 
major international treaty.  
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2. Current Situation 
The US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty created an issue for discussion among 
supporters and critics alike. The supporters of such a move claimed it was necessary in 
order to test and build a limited national missile defense system to protect the United 
States from nuclear blackmail from rogue states or non-state actors with newly 
established nuclear capabilities. John Rhinelander, a negotiator of the original ABM 
Treaty, claimed that the withdrawal would be a “fatal blow” to the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty and could lead to a “world without effective legal constraints on 
nuclear proliferation.”45 However, for months after the Bush decision to withdrawal from 
the ABM, Russia was able to digest the ramifications and their reactions seemed to be 
much more tempered than expected. Since President George W. Bush’s announcement of 
the United States’ intentions to withdrawal from the ABM, the US has intimated the 
desire to discuss with Russia a bilateral reduction in numbers of nuclear warheads. This, 
in conjunction with President Bush’s commitment to nonproliferation and arms reduction 
appears to be another move in shoring up the many systemic problems associated with 
the treaty-based Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime. 
 
C. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) 
1. History 
The main purpose of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to prevent 
nuclear explosions in all environments for military or civilian use. The treaty was open 
for signatures in September 1996 and was signed by seventy-one states, including the five 
declared nuclear weapon states. However, this did not include India and Pakistan, who 
have subsequently declared themselves nuclear weapon states. To this date they still have 
not signed. 
 Article I of the CTBT outlines the basic obligations: 
 
1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any 
such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control. 
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2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, 
encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear 
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.46 
 
The history of the CTBT, however, goes back much further than September 1996. 
Since the beginning of nuclear weapons testing there has been an international desire, 
albeit quiet at times, to limit and/or prevent nuclear testing.  Going back as early as the 
1950s, there was a movement by arms control advocates to ban all nuclear explosions due 
to the nuclear fall-out and the escalating arms race. There were approximately fifty 
explosions between 16 July 1945, when the United States exploded the first nuclear 
device in Alamogordo, New Mexico, to 31 December 1953. Through the years there has 
been limited success in instituting a ban on nuclear explosions. The Partial Test Ban 
Treaty (PTBT) was introduced in 1963 and banned nuclear tests in the atmosphere, space, 
and underwater. The PTBT was not, however, signed by two nuclear weapons states, 
France and China. Another step to eliminating nuclear explosions was the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. This treaty imposed on non-nuclear states the 
prohibition of possessing, manufacturing, or acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
devises. Subsequent to the fall of the “Iron Curtain” and the dismantling of the Soviet 
Empire, the talks for the CTBT began again in 1993, spearheaded by the UN. On 10 
September 1996, the UN General Assembly adopted the CTBT and its two annexes; 
however, on 13 October 1999 the United States Senate refused ratification of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
 
2. Current Situation 
“The failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty last October has fundamentally changed international disarmament and 
nonproliferation efforts.”47 This was a sentiment echoed by a majority of those who had 
hoped for the ratification of the CTBT. Former Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, 
Gen. John Shalikashvili, serving as a Special Advisor of President Clinton to the United 
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States Senate concerning the CTBT,  stated that the CTBT was a piece of legislation he 
fully supported.48 The CTBT was viewed by many supporters as a necessary step for the 
nuclear weapons states to meet the disarmament requirements under the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty’s Article VI. Furthermore, many supporters of the CTBT claim 
that under the legal constraints of the NPT, nations such as the United States and France 
do have obligations to limit testing and development of nuclear weapons.  
The Current Bush Administration, after inheriting the Clinton Administrations 
inability to successfully implement the CTBT via the US Senate, established a “two 
pronged approach to strengthen multilateral arms control for stemming nonproliferation” 
and subsequently limiting nuclear testing.49 The outcome of not instituting the CTBT 
internationally and ineffectualizing it by not being a signatory to it in 1999 has not 
negatively affected the current President Bush’s attempts at limiting nuclear proliferation 
and consequently curtailing any sort of testing as a result. The Bush administration has 
instituted recently President Bush’s Global Nonproliferation policy by emphasizing seven 
proposals and a litany of other steps to bolster any shortcomings in already established 
treaties and agreements. 
 
D. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) 
1. History 
On 1 July 1968 the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was open for 
signatures. Per the treaty there are only five recognized nuclear weapon states: the US, 
Britain, France, China, and the Soviet Union, now Russia. These five nuclear states agree 
not to transfer nuclear weapons technology and material to other states, and non-nuclear 
weapons states agree not to seek to develop nuclear weapons. In May 1995, more than 
170 nations agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely and without any restrictions. Currently  
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the nations of issue regarding their actions in violation of the NPT are North Korea and 
Iran with India and Pakistan necessitating scrutiny for their declaration of nuclear 
capabilities in the late1990s.  
North Korea ratified the NPT but revoked its signature as a result of nuclear 
inspectors’ inspections of North Korea’s non-declared nuclear facilities. Iran was also a 
signatory to the NPT, but has come under suspicion as of late due to their desire to bolster 
an already active plan to develop nuclear weapons. Currently the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) is conducting a probe into this issue. August 2004, United States 
intelligence officials and non-governmental experts concluded that diplomatic efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to Iran and North Korea have failed to slow 
their weapons development programs. India, Pakistan, and Israel all refused to sign the 
NPT and are currently nuclear capable and had they signed the NPT they would be in 
violation of it. South Africa had previously embarked on nuclear weapons program but 
has since signed the NPT and renounced their nuclear capabilities and destroyed their 
nuclear arsenal. Israel seems to be an enigma in the realm of nuclear weapons 
development. There appears to be a very public secret concerning their nuclear weapons 
development that was exposed when Mordecai Vanunu, an Israeli scientist, revealed their 
program to an English newspaper. Although the Israeli government refuses to neither 
confirm nor deny their nuclear weapons program, there have been suspicions that they 
have been actively operating their program for decades.  
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Article VI is a major facet of the NPT and the 
one article that receives the majority of attention. Article VI states, “Each of the parties 
to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control.”50 After over thirty years in existence, Article VI appears 
to be only a promise. Other important articles of the NPT to note are Article I and Article 
X. Article I states that nuclear weapons states will not “induce any non-nuclear weapons 
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states [from]…acquiring nuclear weapons.”51 Article X affirms that any state can 
withdraw from the NPT if they feel that “extraordinary events,” such as a perceived 
threat, forces them to do so.52 
 
2. Current Situation 
The current Bush Administration acknowledges that there are some “remedial 
problems and systemic shortcomings” in the treaty based nonproliferation regimes.53 This 
administration has since turned its attention to improving the existing multilateral treaties 
to better control proliferation. However, critics of the Bush Administration characterize 
his reliance on nuclear weapons as an “addiction” and this addiction is “constructing the 
strongest imaginable rationale for other countries to acquire nuclear weapons.”54 The 
NPT is an important facet of the multilateral treaty-based Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime and has been viewed by the Bush Administration as a tool to reduce nuclear 
weapons via Article VI, but also as a platform for the world to view the actions of the 
five nuclear weapons states. Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Arms Control, in a speech to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 
Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 
New York City stated, “the Bush Administration has contributed in major ways to this 
record, and, indeed, has accelerated policies designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear 
weapons. One of the first major policy initiatives by President Bush was to transform the 
nature of our relationship with Russia and decide to reduce unilaterally U.S. strategic 
nuclear warheads to the lowest level in decades. This U.S. commitment led to a similar 
undertaking by President Putin, and both pledges were later codified in the Moscow 
Treaty, which entered into force on June 1 of last year. The Treaty requires both countries 
to reduce to 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2012. The Bilateral 
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Implementation Commission established under the Treaty had its first meeting in Geneva 
last month.”55 There are several examples of the United States’ commitment to the NPT 
and in particular Article VI. The Moscow Treaty for bilateral reduction in nuclear 
weapons; dismantlement of nuclear weapons; measures put in place to implement strict 
control of fissile material; and cooperative threat reduction (CTC) to assist former Soviet 
republics in disarming their nuclear weapons and capabilities are all examples of steps 
that are being actively taken by the current Bush Administration to curtail the systemic 
problems associated with the treaties and agreements of the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regime.  
 
E. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 
1. Current Situation 
Foremost among President Bush’s efforts to stop WMD proliferation is the 
Proliferation Security Initiative [PSI]. The United States and ten other close allies and 
friends have worked assiduously from May 2003 to develop this initiative, which seeks to 
combat proliferation by developing new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the 
air, and on land. Our goal is to create a more robust approach to preventing WMD, their 
delivery systems, and related materials from flowing to and from states and non-state 
actors of proliferation concern.56 PSI has been initiated in a “fast-moving effort” to 
establish and maintain a harmonized approach to ultimately prevent proliferation. The 
implementation of PSI is meant to operate not as an organization, but as an activity that 
many nations will take part in. Through joint exercises and training evolutions, nations 
will come together to practice and eventually execute missions to prevent the shipment of 
illicit material while gathering human intelligence to further disrupt state and non-state 
actors attempts to engage in nuclear (and all WMD) proliferation. PSI will enable 
multinational efforts to stem proliferation by coordinating with multiple countries to 
“draw upon an enhanced set of authorities for interdiction” while increasing the 
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“cooperation not just among intelligence and military services but in law enforcement as 
well.”57 The current view on PSI is one of global interaction and involvement. In a 
February [2004] address concerning PSI, President Bush (43) stated, “Our message to 
proliferators must be consistent and it must be clear: We will find you, and we’re not 
going to rest until you are stopped.”58 
 
F. PRESIDENT BUSH’S GOALS & POLICIES FOR SUCCESS 
President Bush has “struck the proper balance” concerning nonproliferation 
policies. He has articulated a two-pronged approach to “strengthening multilateral arms 
control for stemming proliferation.” First, President Bush has proposed steps to amend 
and augment the existing treaty-based regime where systemic short comings have been 
identified. Second, he has proposed to strengthen the treaty-based regime by initiating 
internal reform to remedy any issues that are creating problems with countering 
proliferation. Furthermore, the current Bush Administration has proposed several key 
measures and initiatives that will further aid in nonproliferation activity. President Bush 
has initiated a number of Military and Defensive Measures since the events of September 
11th, some of which are central to many debates concerning the efficacy of the Bush 
Administration’s approach to nuclear nonproliferation:  
1. Removing the terrorist-supporting Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001 
2. Adopting a National Security Strategy in 2002 that emphasizes the options for 
preemptive strikes and preventive wars against terrorists and the regimes that 
support them 
3. Establishing the Northern Command, which is charged with providing for the 
defense of the American Homeland 
4. Removing the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq in 2003 
5. Fielding a missile defense system, which is slated to become operational 
[2004/05]59 
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The Bush Administration has also been quite active in strengthening the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Regime’s abilities to control proliferation. Chief among these attempts 
has been the creation and implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 
which is a multilateral effort to interdict illicit weapons and material used for creation of 
WMD, in particular nuclear weapons. In addition, the Bush Administration has been an 
advocate of intelligence community’s efforts in exposing the nuclear black market 
operations run by Pakistan’s lead nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan. Other attempts to enhance 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the treaty-based Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime 
have been centered on shoring up the systemic problems and inherent shortcomings of 
many of these treaties and agreements. For example: 
1. Article V of the NPT establishes an obligation for participating states to 
facilitate the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, even 
though some of these activities may increase the risk of proliferation 
2. The BWC (Biological Weapons Convention) is both unverifiable and 
unenforceable 
3. The CWC (Chemical  Weapons Convention) is also unverifiable and 
unenforceable60 
As a result of the recognition that there does exist systemic problems and inherent 
shortcoming, the Bush Administration has proposed seven steps to improve arms control 
and restrict proliferation: 
1. Broaden the scope of the PSI – to include law enforcement measure to 
supplement the nonproliferation regime 
2. Urge other states to expand their internal control of proliferation activities – in 
order to utilize the power of national governments to aid in controlling 
proliferation and strengthening export controls. 
3. Expand the Nunn-Lugar program – to continue dismantling nuclear weapons 
(programs) in former Soviet republics. 
4.  Curtail the sale of enrichment and reprocessing equipment. 
5. Deny the sale of equipment for civilian nuclear programs to countries that fail 
to observe the IAEA’s Additional Protocol on safeguards – which is designed 
to improve the IAEA’s ability to detect an illicit nuclear weapons program. 
6. Establish a new special committee under the IAEA Board of Governors for 
safeguards and verification – to promote enforcement and limit facilitating the 
international cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities. 
7. Deny positions on the IAEA Board of Governors to states that are under 
investigation for illicit nuclear activities.61 
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The face of proliferation and the reality of the nuclear nonproliferation situation 
post 9/11 has forced, to a degree, the Bush Administration to embrace and effect change 
at all levels internally and externally. With the knowledge that terrorists and states that 
support terrorism are actively trying to develop/build nuclear weapons capabilities, the 
Bush Administration has had to recognize shortcomings and emphasize change in the 
face of bureaucratic resistance. I don’t believe that post 9/11 has afforded a complete 
coherency that has allowed all parties to be complicit in changing, however, I do believe 
that the changes and the forward thinking that has transpired recognizes the need to adjust 
at certain levels and this has been advantageous and furthermore, correct. I do not harbor 
any delusions that President Bush and his Administration are infallible;, but keeping the 
realist mindset associated with international relations in context, the changes that have 
occurred and will continue to occur seem to be appropriate in coordination with the Bush 
Doctrine and his outlook on international diplomacy. Although, there may exist some 
powerful resistance, at times, to change could be a result of a myriad of issues, but the 
reality of today is there is a movement by terrorist to buy, develop, or build nuclear 
weapons capabilities and this directly affects the security of the United States. President 
Bush and his administration has ascertained the situation and has looked at the tools for 
arms control as an effective source to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation in order to 
ultimately prevent terrorist from obtaining nuclear weapons capabilities. President Bush 
has taken the appropriate military and defensive actions to strengthen nonproliferation, as 
well as acknowledging the need to enhance the treaty-based Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Regimes stance on enforcing the treaties and agreements it derives its power from. 
President Bush has also pushed for congressional support in enhancing nuclear 
nonproliferation and Congress must be careful not to undermine the many achievements 
while still maintaining the appropriate oversight. “Arms control is a means to the ends of 
national security, not an end in itself. Congress will only compound the risk of 
catastrophic attack on the American people if it loses sight of this enduring truth.”62 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF RUSSIA’S EFFECTIVENESS ON ISSUES 
OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) was the first large-scale 
program for U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation.. An umbrella 
agreement on the safe and secure transportation, storage, and destruction of weapons and 
the prevention of weapons proliferation, the agreement implementing CTR was signed by 
the presidents of the United States and Russia in June 1992 to provide a framework for 
accelerated implementation of the START I Treaty and to facilitate large-scale 
cooperation between the United States and Russia on nuclear nonproliferation. Also 
known as the Nunn-Lugar program (named for the U.S. senators who sponsored the 
legislation), the initiative focused on Russia and some other former Soviet republics.63 
Although CTR started as an American initiative to institute command, control, 
accountability, transportation security, and destruction of the former Soviet Union 
nuclear arsenal, it has become a multi-national effort in nuclear nonproliferation.  
Even though there were a total of four Soviet Republics that had nuclear weapons 
within their geographical confines, Russia was designated the nation that would harbor 
the former Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile. The four nuclear Soviet Republics were 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine and they signed onto the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program with the understanding that they would be 
responsible for relinquishing their nuclear capabilities to Russia in order to conform to 
the precepts of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, particularly Article VI.  
The effectiveness of these nations’ efforts, particularly Russia, to prevent nuclear 
proliferation is quite subjective. Although there has been many substantial successes 
there appears to always be room for improvement. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine 
have all acted as required under the direction of the CTR, but Russia has, at different 
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times, been quite difficult to coordinate with regarding the transportation, building 
security infrastructures, and dismantlement of the many nuclear weapons they inherited.  
 
B. RUSSIAN EFFECTIVENESS IN PREVENTING NUCLEAR 
PROLIFERATION 
On 21 November 1994, 581kg (1,278 pounds) of HEU was transferred from the 
Ulba Metallurgy Plant 20 miles outside of the northern Kazakhstani city of Ust-
Kamenogorsk to the Y-12 plant at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, in a 
highly secret project code-named “Sapphire.” The project was initiated by President 
Nursultan Nazarbayev with the full knowledge of Russia, according to Kazakhstani 
Deputy Prime Minister Vitaliy Mette, in order to prevent the possibility of diversion by 
terrorists, or by any of the nuclear threshold states near Kazakhstan.64 The uranium, 
reportedly left over from the Soviet Union's secret Alfa submarine program, had been 
stored at Ulba in unsecured and non-safeguarded facilities, without electronic means of 
accounting. Instead, quantities were simply recorded by hand into books.65 Experts 
estimated the uranium was sufficient to make 20-25 nuclear bombs, though it was said a 
"skilled bomb-maker" could have produced as many as 36. One estimate said the material 
was sufficient for up to 50 bombs.66 Kazakhstani experts maintained that only about 5 
percent of the HEU was pure enough to be used for weapons, while the rest would have 
required further processing.67 Thirty-one technicians, led by Oak Ridge scientist Alex 
Riedy, went to Kazakhstan to repackage the uranium into 1,300 steel canisters for 
shipment by two C-5 transport planes from Kazakhstan to the United States.  Empty 
canisters marked with Tehran addresses were reportedly found in the room next to the 
one where the uranium was stored. The United States agreed to compensate Kazakhstan 
for the material, although the transaction was "not handled as a straight business deal." 
The US compensation to Kazakhstan, though undisclosed, was estimated at between $10 
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and $20 million, in both cash and in-kind assistance.68 Project “Sapphire” provides a 
unique example of the lack of command, control, and security that existed in the nuclear 
republics of the former Soviet Union shortly after its collapse. Although this particular 
endeavor between the United States and Kazakhstan may have been unique, it marked a 
significant event of cooperation between the former Soviet nuclear capable republics and 
the United States.  
Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, there has been 
marked cooperation among the nuclear capable republics of the former Soviet Union and 
the United States. Russia’s role, however, appears to be the biggest and in many respects 
the most important. The process of the CTR has many different facets that are designed to 
address the myriad of issues that are of grave concern to the United States, Russia, and 
the international community. These facets are broken down into three primary categories 
with a few subsets each. These three categories and their distributions are: 
1. Chain of Custody 
- Weapons Protection, Control, & Accounting (WPC&A)  
   administered by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) 
 - Material Protection, Control, & Accounting (MPC&A) administered  
       by the Department of Energy (DOE) 
 - Fissile Material Storage 
 - Export Control administered by the U.S. Department of State in     
       coordination with U.S. Department of Commerce on program  
               implementation 
2. Demilitarization  
 - Defense Conversion 
 - Defense Enterprise Fund (DEF) 
 - Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) 
 - International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) 
3. CTR Destruction and Dismantlement  
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These three broad categories and their subsets account for the bulk of what makes 
up the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. By analyzing and assessing the Russian 
and U.S. cooperation in these areas we can get an overview of how effective Russia has 
been in its attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation, not only from within its own borders, 
but including the material and expertise from the three other former Soviet nuclear 
republics. 
Another important aspect to the effectiveness of Russia’s attempts to prevent 
nuclear proliferation is how effectual they are in preventing a terrorist organization from 
penetrating into their nuclear arsenal or purchasing nuclear weapon capabilities. “For 
Russia, nuclear terrorism is not a Hollywood-style scenario. According to the January 
2003 statement of the head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Defense Ministry Gen. 
Valynkin, who is in charge of nuclear weapon security, ‘the information we have 
obtained indicates that international terrorists have been looking for opportunities to get 
unauthorized access to [Russian] nuclear facilities and to provoke acts of terrorism and 
sabotage using nuclear devices’.”69 Although the obvious threats to Russian National 
Security exist regarding terrorists unauthorized access to nuclear devices, weapons grade 
fissile material, and/or the threat to use radioactive matter; the real threat may be the 
“cooperation (or coordination) between various non-state actors, in particular, between 
international terrorist organizations and organized crime communities, which is a new 
phenomenon. With a tremendous increase in their financial power in recent years, non-
state actors have become more aggressive in their attempts to get access to (or to develop 
by themselves) weapons of mass destruction, including a "dirty bomb" scenario.”70 
Terrorist acquisition of nuclear capabilities has become even more of a persistent issue in 
the post September 11th era, where the ever present perceived terrorist threat fused with 
the reality of their actions as witnessed by the destruction wrought by hijacked aircraft.  
The biggest concern for the United is terrorist acquisition of nuclear capabilities 
that are linked to the Russian nuclear arsenal. Russia’s general lack of command and 
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control of its nuclear arsenal and the huge Russian nuclear complex inherited from the 
Soviet Union are the biggest contributors to the possible proliferation of their capabilities. 
This complex is comprised of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons; approximately 200 
metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium (Pu); more than 1200 tons of highly enriched 
uranium (HEU); four serial production plants with huge production capabilities; 
universities, labs, and other institutions dedicated to training the intellectual aspect of 
their nuclear program; and a civilian nuclear program that has very little separation from 
the military complex.71 The Russian nuclear complex inherited from the Soviet Union 
fostered the current fear of nuclear proliferation by having lax command and control, 
security, and accountability. The goal of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program was 
to coherently reduce the threat of uncontrolled Soviet nukes while systematically 
revamping the Russian infrastructure to accommodate the changing climate they were 
experiencing after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the 1990s provided for an 
influx of many different programs that shared the same desired outcome: threat reduction, 
nuclear accountability, and disarmament.  
 
C. ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF SELECTED THREAT REDUCTION AND 
NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS IN RUSSIA 
The following information concerning the accomplishments of selected threat 
reduction and nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russian was gleaned from the 
Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council and a critique written by Michael 
Roston and David Smigielski. Most of the numbers and statistics are from 2003 and 
remain the only current and reliable numerical assessment of some of these programs. 
However, in some instances I have been able to update the numbers according to a more 
recent assessment of the accomplishment of these selected programs. The updated 
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1. Department of Defense (Cooperative Threat Reduction) Programs 
a. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (Russia and NIS) 
       May 2003    2007 (proj.)     2012 (proj.) 
Nuclear warheads deactivated:  6,032         8,371         9,726 
ICBMs destroyed:    506           982         1,264 
ICBM silos eliminated:   438           524          546 
ICBM mobile launchers destroyed:                1                312          400 
Ballistic missile submarines destroyed:       26           35          42 
Sub-launched ballistic missiles eliminated:    382           635          719 
SLBM launchers eliminated:               408          540          664 
Strategic bombers eliminated:              109           128           137 
Nuclear Air-to-Surface Missiles destroyed:    554           708          708 
Nuclear test holes/tunnels sealed:              194           194          19472 
Table 4. Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination 
 
b. Nuclear Weapons Storage Security 
Site Security Enhancements 
 This program provides Russia with equipment necessary to upgrade 
physical security at Ministry of Defense (MOD) nuclear weapons storage sites. 
Accomplishments include: 
• Provided 123 kilometers of “Quick fix” security fencing and associated 
sensor systems for installation at warhead storage sites in Russia. 
• The MOD has installed 42 kilometers of fencing at 52 sites, and 
completed the quick fix installation at more than 30 sites 
• Completed access agreements for further installation in April 2003.73 
 
Security Assessment, Training and Logistics 
Operating from the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) 
located in Sergiyev Posad, Russia, this program enables Department of Defense (DOD) 
and MOD development of a system for physical security upgrades of MOD’s nuclear 
weapons storage sites. SATC continues to test and integrate equipment into MOD’s 
                                                 
72 Defense Threat Reduction Agency Scorecard, March 11, 2003, Projections as of November 6, 2002; 
Additional updates from the Testimony of Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology Security 
Policy and Counterproliferation, Lisa Bronson, on May 8, 2003 
73 Michael Roston and David Smigielski, “Accomplishments of Selected Threat Reduction and 
Nonproliferation Programs in Russia, By Agency,” Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 
10 June 2003, Online database, available at:  
http://www.ransac.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Fast%20Facts/index.asp 
Open link “061003_accomplishments.pdf” 
53 
physical security systems, train and equip MOD’s guard force, and enhance the capability 
of MOD to evaluate personnel with access to nuclear weapons.74 
 
c. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security 
This effort supports secure transport of Russian warheads from 
deployment to storage, and from storage to dismantlement locations. There were 131 
shipments to dismantlement facilities and consolidation sites as of September 2002. 
There are currently, on average, 6-7 shipments per month. DOD has also provided 
funding for 79 specialized railcars used for warhead transport and has contracted for the 
development of emergency response vehicles, nuclear weapons recovery equipment and 
MOD training for response to nuclear accidents. Additional examples of assistance 
provided include security upgrade kits for railcars, secure blankets, and “supercontainers” 
for warhead transport and storage. DOD assisted MOD in certifying the proper 
maintenance of 165 railcars as of the third quarter of 2002, and continues to certify other 
railcars. DOD secured a commitment from Russia to destroy two unusable offensive 
weapons program warhead transport rail cars at its own expense for every new car 
provided by the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program for dismantlement and 
secure storage purposes.75 
 
d. Construction of Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility 
Over 90% of the work on the first wing of the Mayak Facility has been 
completed. When finished during 2003, it will hold 25,000 containers of fissile material 
from more than 6,000 dismantled nuclear weapons. When both wings are completed, the 
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2. Department of Energy Programs 
a. Nonproliferation Policy 
Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) 
This project works with Russia to facilitate conversion of its research and 
test reactors from highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel types to low enriched uranium 
(LEU) fuels. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Successfully tested a generic, high-density LEU fuel type that can be used 
to replace existing HEU fuels. 
• Completed a bilateral agreement with Uzbekistan on cooperation. 
• Conversion analysis was initiated for Soviet-designed research reactors in 
Uzbekistan and Ukraine. 
 
Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) 
This program repatriates civil HEU fuel from Russian-supplied research 
reactors in various countries to Russia, removing dangerous nuclear materials many 
regions of proliferation concern. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Reached preliminary agreement on spent fuel management cost and pilot 
shipment site. 
• Secretary of State Colin Powell and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham 
completed the first agreement with Uzbekistan to repatriate highly 
enriched uranium to Russia and subsequently convert its research reactor 
to low-enriched uranium fuel. The agreement also plans security, safety, 
and storage upgrades at the Uzbek reactor site. 
• Drafted and tabled a bilateral agreement on research reactor fuel transfers 
to Russia. 
• Completed six U.S.-Russia-International Atomic Energy Agency fact-
finding missions to the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia, plus two 
technical preparation visits to Uzbekistan. 
 
Kazakhstan BN-350 Project 
This project prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons by securing the 
nearly three tons of weapons-grade plutonium in spent fuel discharged from the BN-350 
breeder reactor – enough material for hundreds of nuclear weapons. A separate project 
facilitates decommissioning of the facility. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Completed the stabilizing and packaging of spent nuclear fuel in radiation 
barrier canisters, and placed this material under IAEA safeguards. 
• Began joint conceptual design study on dual-use cask proposal to assist 
decision-making in Kazakhstan. 
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• Developed innovative safeguards system to measure plutonium in 
packaged spent fuel assemblies, a unique nuclear fingerprint for each 
canister, and a nuclear materials monitoring system for IAEA usage 
during implementation and verification of the program. 
 
Warhead Dismantlement and Fissile Material Transparency 
DOE has negotiated lab-to-lab contracts to develop methods and 
procedures for secure and transparent dismantlement of Russia’s nuclear warheads. These 
contracts attempt to ensure technical dialog between American and Russian nuclear 
warhead experts, and also to bolster advocates for transparency within the Russian 
nuclear weapons complex. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Completed 35 Lab-to-Lab projects involving joint technology 
development, experiments, and technical interchange meetings; nearly 40 
additional projects are either planned, or ongoing, including 3 technical 
interchange meetings for FY 2003. 
• Specifically negotiated 3 Lab-to-Lab agreements for U.S. access to 
Russian technologies that can support U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. 
• Demonstrated 12 total Russian transparency technologies developed via 
Lab-to-Lab interactions. 
• Arzamas-16 has developed and demonstrated radiation measurement 
technologies for potential application to the dismantlement process, 
including the “Passport System” to measure warhead radiation signatures 
at Russian storage facilities, and the “Radiation Mark System” to uniquely 
tag and monitor warheads during the dismantlement process. 
• Chelyabinsk-70 has conducted transparency technology demonstrations 
that have detected the presence of high explosives during the 
dismantlement process, destroyed high explosive removed from 
dismantled nuclear warheads, destroyed nuclear warhead casings to 
confirm that the dismantlement process is irreversible, and installed a 
computer model of a Russian "hypothetical" Russian dismantlement 
facility for use in analyzing and evaluating the candidate transparency 
technologies and methods. 
 
Mayak Fissile Material Storage Facility Transparency/Trilateral Initiative 
This program is intended to help verify through bilateral and multilateral 
means the weapons origin of the material to be stored in the Mayak Fissile Material 
Storage Facility. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Devised an “attribute verification with information barriers” technique for 
monitoring of nuclear weapons storage sites without divulging weapons 
secrets. 
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• Developed a Subsidiary Arrangement for implementation of the Trilateral 
Initiative of the U.S., Russian Federation, and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency at the Mayak site, which will advance IAEA involvement 
in verification activities on weapon-origin fissile material.77 
  
b. Export Control Program 
International Nuclear Export Control Program 
This program works with governments in Russia, the NIS, and other states 
to strengthen national systems of international nuclear export control. It targets emerging 
suppliers and high-traffic transit nations. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Facilitated improvement in Russian and NIS export licensing procedures 
by establishing partnerships between governments and technical experts, 
as well as installing an automated licensing systems. Recently installed a 
secure export license review system in Kazakhstan. 
• Encouraged industry compliance with Russian and NIS export control 
regulations with regional and site-specific industry outreach, provision of 
compliance software tools, and the production of an export control 
newsletter. Recently conducted 7 industry compliance  workshops in 
Russia and the Ukraine. 
• Developed enforcement capability by enhancing training courses and 
curricula for Russian and NIS Customs Academies and training customs 
inspectors to better identify nuclear-related commodities. 
• Expanded successful efforts previously used in other states to Baltic, 
Caucasus, and Central Asian states, including the provision of expert 
nuclear advice to law enforcement and border agencies and training-the-
trainers programs.78 
 
c. International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation 
Navy Complex 
This program improves security in two areas. First, it installs improved 
nuclear material protection, control, and accounting systems at 36 Russian naval warhead 
storage sites (5 storage sites, 27 operational sites, and 4 rail transfer points) containing 
approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads. Second, it improves security over the estimated 
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60 metric tons (MTs) of HEU in 34 buildings at 11 naval fuel storage facilities and 
shipyards where nuclear materials are present. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Installed rapid security upgrades on all of the Russian Navy’s estimated 
4,000 nuclear warheads, and comprehensive upgrades on 40% of the 
warheads. Rapid upgrades have been installed at 33 of the 36 sites; 
comprehensive upgrades were completed at 8 locations, and initiated at 5 
more as of January 2003. 
•  Completed comprehensive upgrades on 98% of the Navy’s weapons 
usable material. Comprehensive upgrades were finished at 9 of the 11 fuel 
storage sites. At these sites, work was completed at 27 buildings, partially 
completed at 1 building, and recently initiated at 4 buildings. 
 
Strategic Rocket Forces 
This program improves security on Russian warheads by installing 
MPC&A systems at Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) storage sites. Agreement was reached 
to initiate this program in FY 2004. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Signed vulnerability assessment and conceptual design contracts for 2 
SRF pilot project sites.  
 
Minatom Weapons Complex  
This program provides upgrades to Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) 
nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment, and material processing/storage sites, containing 
500 MTs of HEU and weapon-grade plutonium at 133 buildings in ten closed “nuclear 
cities.” Accomplishments to date include: 
• Installed rapid upgrades on 20% of the weapons-usable nuclear material in 
the complex, and comprehensive upgrades on 4%. 
• Completed upgrades on 14 buildings, partially completed at 12 buildings, 
and recently initiated work at 20 buildings in the complex. 
• Negotiated access to 35 new buildings in the weapons complex. 
• Signed 24 new contracts, mostly concerning rapid upgrades and physical 
protection system design, with Weapons Complex entities, including 
design contracts to protect 80 MT of weapons-usable material at the 
Tomsk-7 Chemical Metallurgical Plant. 
• Developed central storage facilities at the Chelyabinsk-70 and Arzamas-16 








Civilian Nuclear Sites 
This program installs MPC&A systems in 76 buildings at 18 Russian sites, 
in addition to 13 non-Russian sites, containing approximately 40 MTs of the most 
vulnerable material of proliferation concern. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Installed rapid upgrades on 98% of 40 MTs of weapons-usable nuclear 
material. 
• Comprehensive upgrades completed on 54% of materials. 
• Comprehensive upgrades have been completed at 11 of 18 Russian sites. 
At these sites, work was completed at 58 buildings, partially completed at 
5 buildings, and recently initiated at 1 building. 
• Comprehensive upgrades have been completed at all non-Russian sites. 
 
Material Conversion and Consolidation 
This program reduces the complexity and the long-term costs of securing 
Russian weapons-usable nuclear material by consolidating excess, non-weapons highly 
enriched uranium and plutonium into fewer, more secure locations. Accomplishments to 
date include: 
• Converted 3.5 of a total of 29 MTs of HEU planned to be converted to 
LEU; elimination of an additional 1 MT to be completed before the end of 
2003. 
• Inventoried all nuclear materials at the Obninsk Institute of Physics and 
Power Engineering, and relocated its Central Storage Facility to a newly 
remodeled building. 
• Will complete removal of fissile material from 23 buildings by the end of 
FY 2003, reducing the number of locations where material is stored from 
162 to 139 buildings. 
 
Radiological Dispersal Devices 
This program identifies and pursues actions that can be taken to reduce the 
threat of a radiological attack against the United States. Specific attention is given to 
prioritizing better control of materials of greatest concern throughout the world. It 
cooperates with the IAEA to complete work in Russia and the former Soviet Union. 
Accomplishments to date include: 
• Completed an initial assessment of risks from former Soviet orphaned 
radioactive sources. 
• Initiated security upgrades at 4 sites in Russia, 3 in Uzbekistan, and 1 in 
Georgia. 
• Initiated activities to locate, consolidate, and secure 9 orphan or surplus 
radioactive sources stored at one site in Georgia. 
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National Programs and Sustainability 
This program includes projects to help ensure sustained operation and 
maintenance by Russia of installed MPC&A systems, assist Russian development of a 
legal and regulatory framework on nuclear matters, and support the growth of MPC&A 
expert cadres in Russia. Accomplishments to date include: 
• To promote transportation security, hardened 22% of 638 trucks and 41% 
of 143 rail cars; the program also provided 13% and hardened 40% of the 
488 secure transportation overpacks. 
• Installed unattended monitoring systems (MPC&A Operations Monitoring 
Systems – or MOMS) to allow Russian and U.S. officials to ensure 
ongoing operation of installed MPC&A systems, with 3% of the work 
completed. 
• Observed 37 inspections/exercises of MPC&A systems at Russian nuclear 
sites by Gosatomnadzor (GAN, the Russian nuclear safety inspectorate), 
Minatom or Ministry of the Interior. 
• Completed 71 communications connections so that Material Balance 
Areas at Russian sites can report to the Russian Federal MPC&A 
Information System (FIS). 
• Initiated needs assessment and design activities for an MPC&A support 
facility in the Kola region. 
• Enhanced the equipment of protective forces of nuclear materials by 
distributing bulletproof vests, helmets, response vehicles, cold-weather 
uniforms, and other items; rapid upgrades were completed for 5 Russian 
sites, and 5 Ukrainian sites. 
 
Second Line of Defense 
The SLD program provides equipment and training to Russian customs 
and border security units, to detect, interdict, and prevent nuclear smuggling from Russia 
and other former Soviet states. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Installed 130 radiation detection equipment systems at 15 additional 
strategic transit and border sites, preventing illicit trafficking in nuclear 
materials at a total of 20 locations in Russia. 
• Provided introductory training to 24 Ukrainian border enforcement 
officials for nuclear material detection and WMD recognition.79 
• Surveyed border sites in Kazakhstan.80 
                                                 
79 Department of Energy FY04, FY03 Budget Justification, Section 1205 Report to Congress, 
February 2003, Reports Required by Congress in the FY02-FY04 Defense Authorization Act, Key Reports 
Relating to Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Environmental Clean-up, and Nuclear Waste 
Management, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, Online Database, available at:  
http://www.ananuclear.org/fy0204reportsrequired.html 
60 
• A mobile training platform has been deployed, complete with training 
materials, equipment, and video demonstrations. 
• Training materials have been developed for use by the 30,000 Russian 
Customs field personnel.81 
• Different types of equipment have been evaluated at the U.S. national 
laboratories for use in the program, including a unique Russian-built 
system for inspecting rail cars. 
• Assumed responsibility for installation of radiation detection equipment in 
19 states throughout Eastern/Central Europe, the Caucasus, and Central 
Asia.82 
 
d.  International Safeguards 
Sustainability of Safeguards and Security Systems in the NIS/Baltics 
In order to develop appropriate systems and procedures to sustain the 
security of protected nuclear material for the foreseeable future in the former Soviet 
Republics, this program works with national laboratories, private sector entities, and 
IAEA specialists to develop security infrastructures and create a safeguarding culture 
consistent with international norms within participating states. Accomplishments to date 
include: 
• Site security upgrades were completed at 13 non-Russian nuclear sites. 
• Enhanced previously-installed security upgrades in Uzbekistan. 
• Provided physical security and MPC&A training to personnel from 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
• Completed detailed vulnerability assessments of physical security and 
safeguards systems at 3 sites in Ukraine, one site in Kazakhstan, and one 
site in Latvia. 
• Signed contracts for additional upgrades at two sites in Kazakhstan; 
initiated negotiations for upgrades at two sites in Ukraine. 
• Signed contract for long-term sustainability plans in Kazakhstan.83 
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e. Russian Transitions Initiative 
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) 
This program facilitates reduction of the Russian nuclear weapons 
complex by removing functions and equipment from the weapons facilities within the 
closed nuclear cities and helping to create sustainable, alternative non-weapons work for 
scientists who will be displaced by downsizing. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Initialed NCI Access Arrangement with Russia. 
• Converted a total of 550,000 square feet of weapons facilities to civilian 
use. 
• Signed closure agreement with Russia, which publicly commits Minatom 
to cease nuclear weapons work at Avangard by 2003. 
• Achieved a 15% reduction in the physical footprint of the Avangard 
nuclear weapons plant in Sarov, including removal of super-computers 
from two facilities. 
• Leveraged $24.7 million funding from industry, plus $50 million for 
complex downsizing and $4.8 million to 24 NCI projects from Minatom 
with $37.5 million in US government spending. 
• Assisted 370 nuclear cities workers in finding employment. 
• Opened Open Computing Centers in Sarov and Snezhinsk, which employ 
former weapons scientists in the areas of software development and 
modeling complex systems through contract research with U.S. national 
laboratories and private companies, including Adapco, Oracle, Lucent, and 
Animatek. 
• Opened International Development Centers (IDC) in Zheleznogorsk and 
Snezhinsk. IDCs are Russian non-profit organizations that support efforts 
by residents to diversify the economies of the cities. The IDCs helped 
create 280 jobs. 
• Trained 1,800 individuals in business management and marketing skills. 
• Created two nonproliferation centers in the closed nuclear cities of 
Snezhinsk and Sarov. The establishment of the centers is part of a strategy 
for developing nonproliferation analysis and research as a form of 
alternative, non-weapons employment for Russian nuclear weapons 
scientists, while also promoting a nonproliferation culture within Russia. 
• Facilitated the award of $17 million in Minatom defense conversion funds 
to the Zheleznogorsk City Administration by supporting project evaluation 
and other required activities. 
 
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) 
This program engages former Soviet weapons of mass destruction 
scientists and experts in cooperative, non-weapons-related projects involving the ten 
major DOE National Laboratories and U.S. industry. Accomplishments to date include: 
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• Attracted $50 million of venture capital funding for commercializing five 
IPP projects. 
• Engaged over 13,000 NIS scientists, engineers, and technicians since 
program inception; approximately 5,000 are currently employed in applied 
R&D projects. 
• Successfully partnered with 97 different American businesses, leveraging 
over $125 million matching contributions by U.S. industry to support 
government expenditures. US industry currently shares the costs of 132 
different projects. 
• Five projects attracted $60 million in private-sector venture capital beyond 
industry partner commitments. 
• Currently 400 projects are underway at 170 institutes in Russia, Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan. Over 100 of these projects are underway in Russia’s 
closed nuclear cities, particularly Sarov, Snezhinsk, Zheleznogorsk, and 
Zelenogorsk.84 
• Successfully commercialized 12 projects, representing over $30 million in 
sales and 1,000 long-term jobs created in the former Soviet Union 
• Developed technologies with significant counter-terrorism applications, 
including: needle-free injector systems for mass inoculations; light-weight 
radiation detectors to detect nuclear materials smuggling; and high-
technology, high-volume filters to remove dangerous pathogens from 
public water supplies.85 
 
f. HEU Transparency Implementation 
This program develops and implements mutually-agreeable transparency 
measures for the February 1993 HEU Purchase Agreement between the United States and 
the Russian Federation, helping to provide overall confidence that the material is 
weapons origin, and is being downblended and not recycled into new weapons. 
Accomplishments to date include: 
• Verified the conversion of 171.3 MTs of HEU to LEU from 1995 through 
December 2002. 
• Conducted 18 of the 24 allowed Special Monitoring Visits at Russia’s four 
uranium processing facilities in Fiscal Year 2002. 
• Completed an agreement between DOE and Minatom, at the Ministerial 
level, in July 2001 to install Blend Down Monitoring System (BDMS) 
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equipment at the remaining two Russian blending facilities, with 
completed installation at both sites planned for 2004. 
• The BDMS at Ural Electrochemical Plant (UEIP) was operational 90% of 
the time. 
• Staffed the Transparency Monitoring Office at Novouralsk near UEIP for 
30 of the plant’s 50-week operational cycle in FY 2002. 
• Obtained 80,000 pages of material accountability data from Russia. 
• Negotiated access to BDMS equipment at the Zheleznogorsk 
Electrochemical Plant.86 
 
g. International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation 
This program is DOE/NNSA’s focal point for international nuclear safety 
and emergency management policies and programs. Working on a broad array of 
international efforts, the program includes activities involving Soviet-designed research 
reactor safety and shutdown, BN-350 breeder reactor shutdown, and nuclear power plant 
protection from sabotage and terrorist attacks. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Fabricated, installed, and operated cesium traps for decontamination of 
coolant at the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan, thus completing 20% of 
required efforts toward the goal of a FY 2002 shutdown.  
• Connected 7 Russian nuclear sites to a Situation and Crisis Center. 87 
 
h. Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production 
DOE is now the executive agent for this program, which will help Russia 
refurbish or construct fossil fuel energy plants, enabling Russia to shut down its last three 
plutonium production reactors that also provide heat and electricity to cities in Siberia. 
Accomplishments to date include: 
• DOE completed its first plutonium storage monitoring visit under the 
Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement. 
• Contracts for initial work at Zheleznogorsk and Seversk were placed.88 
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i. Accelerated Material Disposition 
This new initiative, resulting from the May 2002 Bush-Putin Presidential 
Summit, re-commits the United States and the Russian Federation to the elimination of 
additional weapons-usable highly enriched uranium. Accomplishments to date include: 
• Completed technical experts report on accelerated nuclear materials 
reduction involving HEU/LEU purchase and stockpile, HEU research 
reactor fuel purchase, accelerated RERTR activities, and accelerated 
Material Conversion and Consolidation implementation. 89 
 
j. Fissile Materials Disposition 
Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition 
In September 2000, the U.S. and Russia signed the Plutonium 
Management and Disposition Agreement, which seeks to transform excess weapons 
plutonium into forms unusable for weapons. This program will facilitate the final 
disposition of 68 total tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium (34 tons each from both 
Russia and the U.S.). Accomplishments to date include: 
• Within the framework of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, pledges above and beyond 
the originally announced $200 million amount have reportedly been 
produced, from the United Kingdom, Japan, Italy and France to support 
plutonium disposition. 
• Completed a number of technical tasks to enable plutonium disposition, 
including equilibrium core design for VVER-1000 reactors to burn 
plutonium-uranium mixedoxide (MOX) fuel. 
• Initiated discussions on the details of the program for disposing of surplus 
Russian weapons-grade plutonium. 
• Supported development of gas-turbine, modular helium reactor to expand 
plutonium disposition capacity in Russia. 
• Detailed design of MOX Fuel Fabrication facilities will be completed and 
construction of the facilities in both Russia and the US will begin during 
FY 2004. 90 
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3. Department of State Programs 
a. Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) 
The EXBS program broadly seeks to stem the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction by ensuring that potential suppliers have proper controls on exports of 
arms, dual-use goods, and related technologies. EXBS operates active programs in over 
30 countries. It also helps states that may serve as transit and transshipment points to 
develop the tools to interdict illicit shipments. Within Russia and former Soviet states, the 
program has worked to improve national legal and regulatory infrastructures related to 
export controls; provided equipment and training in WMD identification and interdiction 
techniques for customs officers, border guards, and other personnel; and encouraged 
regional cooperation in the interdiction of smuggled materials among former Soviet 
states. The State Department intends to continue funding for projects in the FSU for 
2003/2004 while expanding to countries (both source and transit) in South Asia, the 
Balkans, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. In addition, sophisticated detection 
equipment is to be supplied to the Baltic States.91 
 
b. International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) and 
Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU) 
The Science Centers Program, working through the ISTC and the STCU, 
is a multilateral program funding projects aimed at preventing WMD proliferation by 
redirecting former Soviet weapons scientists and experts to peaceful scientific endeavors. 
Since 1993, the Science Centers Program has engaged almost 50,000 scientists and 
engineers and continues to support nearly 2,000 scientific research and development 
projects, producing 270 patentable ideas. As of February 2003, ISTC has funded 1,704 
projects valued at $498 million. Biological and life science projects made up the largest 
share of the funding (24.5%). The STCU funds nearly 500 projects totaling $66 million. 
During 2002, ISTC provided direct grant payments to 25,857 scientists and their team 
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members, producing redirection for 7,690 full-time person-years, added 31 new Partner 
Organizations, and approved the accession of Tajikistan to the ISTC Agreement.92 
  
c. Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF) 
The CRDF supports the prevention of "brain drain" of former Soviet 
scientists and engineers by funding collaborative non-weapons research and development 
projects. Using a grant from the State Department, the CRDF supports the review process 
for proposals submitted to institutes under the Science Centers Program. CRDF's nuclear 
nonproliferation commitment spans across most of its program areas, including the 
Closed Cities program, the Cooperative Grants program, and the Next Steps to Market 
program. By the end of 2000, more than 700 defense scientists had participated in 235 
projects budgeted at more than $10 million. 93 
 
d. Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) 
NDF, part of the State Department's Bureau of Nonproliferation, is 
designed to respond to immediate, unanticipated proliferation challenges in various 
countries throughout the world. NDF works with DOE to identify and dispose of HEU 
from Soviet-supplied research reactors throughout the world. In 2003, NDF intends to 
expand its Dangerous Materials Initiative, a program that inventories, secures, and 
removes dangerous materials from insecure locations worldwide. In addition, funds will 
go to expanding NDF's Tracker program, an automated export control system. Further 
planned activities include a worldwide fissile materials protection initiative and 
assistance to foreign governments in developing indigenous protection capabilities. As of 
2002, NDF has overseen the removal of 100 lbs of HEU from the Vinca reactor in 
Belgrade, the destruction of 24 SS-23 missiles, 47 SCUD missiles, and 50 FROG 
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missiles, and assisted Cyprus in returning nuclear reactor parts en route to the Middle 
East to a more secure location.94 
 
D. CONCLUSION: STEPS TO IMPROVE THE COOPERATIVE     
RELATIONSHIP  
 Russia’s coordination with the United States on issues of nuclear nonproliferation 
has, at times, been strained. On the other hand, there has been significant cooperation 
between the two nations on some facets of nuclear nonproliferation. Information gleaned 
from an interview with Dr. Siegfried Hecker, the former Director of the Los Alamos 
National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico, confirmed that both cases exist. 
Although there is a fair amount of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on paper, 
there is much room for improvement. Dr. Hecker intimated that the United States, post-
Soviet collapse, was more threatened by Russian weaknesses than Russian strengths and 
therefore should have a significant amount of vested interest in maintaining a high level 
of cooperation with Russia in order to further account for, secure, protect, and eventually 
destroy the excessive Russian nuclear materials. 
 Dr. Hecker claimed that one of the principle issues that has changed the nature of 
the U.S.-Russian cooperation has been “based on the inadequate security and the 
changing security environment, principally in Russia, but in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and the 
Ukraine as well.”95 Furthermore, after several trips to Russian nuclear labs, Dr. Hecker 
felt that another big impediment to further cooperation from Russia is centered on the fact 
that Russians do not feel that their nuclear weapons, fissile material, weapons 
capabilities, and technical experts are vulnerable or compromisable. “The Soviet Union 
had an admirable record of safeguarding its weapons-usable materials from theft or 
diversion. It relied on strict personnel and physical security along with all of the other 
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protections of a centrally controlled police state. Even during my [Dr. Hecker] first visit 
to the Russian nuclear facilities in 1992, it was obvious that they were ill-equipped to 
deal with the changes resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union and loss of central 
control.”96 The Russian scientists didn’t recognize the threats of proliferation from within 
posed to the safety and security of their nuclear complex. This notion was directly 
addressed via the Material Protection, Control, & Accountability (MPC&A) program 
which was and continues to be a major part of the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) 
function within the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. A major function of the 
DOE’s work centered on the “lab-to-lab” cooperation between Russia and the United 
States. This “partnership mechanism was essential to deal with the enormous sensitivity 
Russians associated with all the nuclear facilities, and this made it possible to break the 
stalemate that had slowed government-to-government efforts in this area.”97 Initially, 
MPC&A lab-to-lab coordination yielded significant improvements in cooperation, 
however, over time and as the “program grew, the United States lost sight of the fact that 
these are Russian nuclear materials in the Russian nuclear complex. As the U.S. approach 
changed from a cooperative approach to a more confrontational, bureaucratic approach, 
the Russian side began to resist what it considered excessive U.S. intrusiveness into its 
defense facilities.”98 Combining this change in U.S. approach, with, as Dr. Hecker 
surmised, the differing points of view on what was “secure enough” and Russian 
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president, Vladimir Putin’s pragmatic approach to his country’s nuclear defense facilities, 
the subsequent cooperation between the United States and Russia slowed dramatically.99  
 Another aspect of the U.S.-Russian cooperation is the remaining work that must 
be done to further secure and safeguard the remaining Russian, Kazakhstani, Belarusian, 
and Ukrainian fissile material. “The remaining work will be very difficult because greater 
cooperation and trust are required to extend the program to the more sensitive facilities 
with large amounts of fissile material. Also, U.S. demands for strict accountability 
regarding the expenditures of U.S. funds naturally conflict with strict Russian secrecy 
requirements.”100 Yet another aspect of nuclear material protection is centered on the 
protection of these fissile materials against possible terrorist acquisition for not only 
detonation but dispersal as well. This notion is only more prevalent in the post September 
11th era where the concern for terrorist with nuclear capabilities is unalterably feared. The 
fear of nuclear terrorism and proliferation provides a segue to further the cooperative 
efforts that already exist. The future of U.S.-Russian cooperation will necessitate Russia 
and the other former Soviet nuclear republics realizing the vulnerabilities of the their 
nuclear complex and a subsequent “comprehensive reassessment of what facilities 
represent the most urgent threat…The joint reassessment should address what remains to 
be done to increase the security of the most vulnerable nuclear materials by greater 
protection or consolidation.”101 Dr. Hecker highlights seven areas for potential 
cooperation: 
1. Improve nuclear materials protection and remove weapons-usable nuclear 
materials in Kazakhstan. The Republic of Kazakhstan inherited from the 
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Soviet Union one commercial breeder reactor and four research reactors, all of 
which use fuel posing a significant proliferation risk.102 
2. Refocus Material Protection, Control, & Accounting (MPC&A) at military 
sites, including the weapons assembly and disassembly facilities.  With two of 
four Russian serial production plants scheduled to close by 2006, the United 
States and Russia need to focus on the nuclear materials that still need modern 
safeguard systems. 103 
3. Accelerate MPC&A with the Russian Navy. Significant progress has been 
made since the early 1990s to secure the nuclear material associated with the 
Russian Navy. However, progress needs to be made in executing the measures 
needed to sustain consistent securing of spent naval nuclear fuels.104 
4. Reengineer MPC&A at Russian civilian nuclear sites. “It is time for both sides 
to take stock of accomplishments and remaining challenges and redesign the 
program accordingly.”105 This would require the Russians to take 
responsibility for regulatory reform and enhance safeguards within the 
Russian government. Coordination with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) on issue of safeguards would be advisable. 
5. Downsize civilian and military nuclear complexes. “The number of facilities 
that require nuclear safeguards in Russia and the Newly Independent States 
(NIS) may be nearly one hundred. This factor needs to be consolidated into 
fewer but better protected faciltities. This most likely would require 
significant cooperation with the United States for funding and technical 
help.106 
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6. Explore and remediate non-conventional proliferation threats. Evaluation of, 
not only high-grade nuclear material, but low-grade material as well. Low-
grade material could be from production residue, nuclear waste, nuclear 
testing residue, or nuclear systems accidentally or intentionally dumped at sea. 
“In addition, such low-grade weapons useable materials and other nuclear 
isotopes pose a significant threat for radioactive dispersal devises by terrorists, 
sub-national groups, or rogue countries.”107  
7. Enhance “second-line” defense border control programs. This program aims 
to enhance border controls in order to augment protection at the source by 
focusing on prevention of nuclear shipments across the Russian border. 
Although the Russian border is massive, enhancing “second-line” defense will 
aid in deterring nuclear smuggling.108 
These seven areas combined with aggressive prevention of nuclear exports from 
the former Soviet republics’ stockpiles and the immense Russian stockpile will further 
aid in the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Export of nuclear material by Russia has 
been a concern since the collapse of the Soviet Union and, more so, since their relatively 
recent agreements with India and Iran. However, “regardless of how the overall 
relationship between the United States and Russia develops, it is in the interest of the 
United States to have Russia be a responsible exporter of nuclear technologies.”109 This 
will require an agreement on the “virtues and prospects of nuclear power,” and to close 
the gap between the respective differing views of how nuclear technology can be 
employed to provide power and other benefits and not just weapons.110 The United States 
will have to lead the way on cooperative efforts in order to facilitate instances of joint 
proliferation risk assessment for nuclear power and fuel cycles, joint export control, joint 
research on reactor safety, and joint research on proliferation-resistant fuel cycles. These 
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cases for possible collaborative efforts are essential to stemming the Russian tide of 
nuclear exports.  
Prevention of the export of scientific and nuclear “know-how” is another 
necessary step needed to be taken in order to further prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and weapons knowledge. With the purpose of preventing “brain drain” the 
United States and Russian must also address the enormous Russian nuclear complex to 
include their weapons producing capacity and their weapons stockpiles.  The Russian 
nuclear complex was inherited from the Soviet Union and it was massive. This complex 
is a state within a state; it encompasses cities with infrastructures to accommodate over a 
million people at the various different sites. This nuclear complex has built over 100,000 
weapons and has created huge amounts of nuclear material: 125 to 200 metric tons of 
plutonium, >1200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, and 30 metric tons of 
reprocessed civilian plutonium. Furthermore, the former Soviet complex has an enormous 
production capacity. The Russians inherited three major nuclear materials production 
sites and four serial production plants. The intellectual capacity is quite large as well, to 
include 3 major labs, dedicated universities, and dozens of other institutes.111 The points 
for cooperation to prevent “brain-drain” start with effectively reducing the Russian 
nuclear complex and to, subsequently, offer alternative employment for those with 
technical expertise to prevent them from selling their services to rogue states or terrorist 
organizations. This is not an easy proposition; however, gainful employment for those 
with technical expertise is essential and may require funding from the West in addition to 
intense Russian involvement to discourage their scientists from selling their knowledge.  
Another point for collaboration between Russia and the United States is 
concerned with the prevention of nuclear accidents and environmental disasters. “In the 
nuclear business, anyone’s accident is everyone’s accident, whether reactors or weapons 
are involved.”112 The concern with the stewardship of nuclear material is two fold. On 
the one hand, there is wide concern for the safe keeping and implementation of nuclear                                                  
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weapons and reactors from an international perspective in order to prevent a global 
catastrophe. On the other hand, the fear of undermining the public’s trust and avoiding 
environmental disasters while in controlling nuclear material must be considered essential 
to U.S.-Russian cooperative efforts. Although environmental disasters are “typically 
localized,” there are instances of former Soviet practices “such as nuclear dumping in the 
artic seas and nuclear test practices at the Semipalantinsk test site in Kazakhstan” that 
clearly extend into the international arena and must be addressed.113 It is clearly in the 
interest of the United States that another “Chernobyl accident or some other nuclear 
weapons of facility accident in Russia or the NIS be avoided.”114 To facilitate the 
avoidance of such events from occurring, there are at least four instances for possible 
cooperation between the United States and Russia.  
1. Collaboration for nuclear accident prevention. This would require a joint 
technical working group to examine collaborative steps that could be 
implemented to aid in the avoidance of nuclear accidents.115 
2. Nuclear complex cleanup. The United States could share its experiences in the 
arena of successes and lessons learned in order to further aid in preventing 
international implications of nuclear negligence. This would obviously foster 
further cooperation and could lead to international involvement.116 
3. Environmental research and development collaboration. The sharing of 
environmental information, databases, and joint research could offer Russia 
and the United States, not only valuable information on environmental 
impacts, but positive cooperation on a necessary issue that could lead to 
further cooperation on more sensitive issues. 
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4. Collaboration on health effects. This effort would help to derive research on 
health effects of radioactive contamination. Both parties would benefit form 
this collaborative effort.117 
 
Essentially, the risk the Russian nuclear complex poses to the United States 
national security requires that positive steps must be taken to ensure an increase in 
constructive cooperation. As depicted throughout this chapter, there have been many 
dramatic improvements via the various treaties and agreements, however, many urgent 
issues still exist over a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A more 
collaborative relationship needs to be fostered in order to facilitate further accounting, 
securing, control, and destruction of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. This cooperative 
effort needs to be viewed in the stratum of affecting the future Russian nuclear programs. 























                                                  
117 Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, “Thoughts about an Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with 
Russia,” The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey 




Information highlighting current cooperative efforts between the United States 
and Russian has been presented throughout this thesis. As well, information indicating 
that their cooperative relationship has a long road to unfettered success has been 
provided. It is the latter that will be essential to further expanding cooperation and 
collaboration between these two countries.  Currently there are several international 
agreements, treaties, and programs that drive the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
The primary initiative, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, works in concert with 
other threat reduction and arms elimination programs (SORT, START I/II, NPT, CTBT, 
& PSI) in order to successfully reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation from the former 
Soviet nuclear stockpile. However, the goal of globalizing these efforts in order to 
prevent global nuclear proliferation has recently become a principal issue in the 
international arena. This is a result, primarily, of the fear generated from the events of 
September 11, 2001, and the growing concern of rogue state and terrorist organizations 
acquisition of nuclear weapons or fissile material. The future of threat reduction and arms 
elimination will undoubtedly be centered on international agreements and treaties with 
the United States playing a chief role, and Russia, to a lesser degree offering assistance 
and providing a model from which programs can be measured to determine their efficacy. 
This is due in part to the work and success, thus far, of U.S.-Russian cooperation. 
Additionally, the United States has keen interest, financial resources, military 
infrastructure, and the requisite nuclear technology and capabilities to be a primary 
member of this international movement.  
Through the efforts of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and the various 
other arms elimination and proliferation prevention agreements the future cooperation 
between Russia and the United States must continue to drive forward. The success of 
these programs and agreements, however, will be the ultimate litmus test of how effective 
the cooperation between the United States and Russia will continue to be. Currently, 
there is a need for a “global approach to secure all nuclear weapons, as well as HEU 
[highly enriched uranium], plutonium, and other fissile material, to safeguard against 
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illicit nuclear weapons programs, trafficking, and terrorism.”118 Furthermore, to 
successfully implement a global approach to nuclear nonproliferation, focus must first be 
on the U.S.-Russian relationship and continued cooperation to “overcoming obstacles 
such as liability and other legal and political issues that have seriously hindered progress 
in the U.S.-Russian CTR partnership in recent years.”119 The general consensus dictates 
that to emphasize the importance of a continued good will relationship, there should be a 
summit between the Russian and American Presidents. The goal of such a summit should 
be a comprehensive review of the current CTR programs and their success and “to decide 
what steps need to be taken to accelerate and sustain this joint effort.”120 Also, a review 
of incentives for maintaining threat reduction initiatives will further aid in establishing 
and maintaining continuity between localized nonproliferation efforts in Russia and the 
globalizing efforts currently being initiated by the United States. In a key 
nonproliferation speech on 11 February 2004, President Bush introduced a seven step 
approach to globalize the prevention of nuclear proliferation to include globalizing the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program. These seven steps, again, are: 
1. Broaden the scope of the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
2. Urge other states to expand their internal control of proliferation activities. 
3. Expand the Cooperative Threat Reduction program. 
4. Curtail the sale of enrichment and reprocessing equipment. 
5. Deny the sale of civilian nuclear equipment for those nations that fail to 
observe the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional 
Protocol on Safeguards. 
6. Establish a new special committee under the IAEA Board of Governors 
for safeguards and verification. 
7. Establish a new committee under the IAEA’s Board of Governors for 
Safeguard and Verification. Deny positions on the IAEA’s Board of 
Governors for Safeguard and Verification to states that are under 
investigation for illicit nuclear activity.121                                                  
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The Cooperative Threat Reduction program may offer the framework for the most 
efficacious way to globalize the nuclear nonproliferation effort. A prime reason is that 
CTR has proven to be fluid. “CTR programs have evolved and expanded over time, 
adjusting to Russian, [NIS] states, and U.S. priorities, as well as to changing perceptions 
about which threats posed the greatest risk. The programs have also bowed upon occasion 
to bureaucratic intransigence and practical considerations. In one notable incident, 
Department of Energy officials provided blankets to facility guards who were leaving 
their posts to collect wood to build fires. As the economy worsened in Russia in the mid-
1990s, CTR projects sought to provide alternative employment and sources of income for 
unpaid or out-of-work WMD scientists. Increased reports of attempts to steal nuclear 
material highlighted the need for CTR to address material protection, control and 
accounting (MPC&A) measures for nuclear material, consolidation of nuclear weapons 
and material, and secure transportation. The United States developed a practical 
approach: “quick-fixes,” like bars on windows, blast-proof doors, fences, followed by a 
second stage that included more sophisticated security measures like sensors, cameras, 
and personnel access measures.”122 The fact that CTR has been able to adjust to the 
threat and/or priorities as they change over time makes it a unique program to cite as a 
major example for the globalizing nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Additionally, CTR has 
already gone through the growing pains of trial and error, and for the most part has 
incorporated the necessary tools to be proactive vice strictly reactive. The possible uses 
of CTR outside of the former Soviet Union may be done in the realm of a four part 
approach. 
1. Weapons Security. This may be simply funding for the training of armed guards. 
“Nonetheless, some observers have advocated assistance to improve nuclear 
weapons security with the objective of ensuring that weapons could not be stolen 
or detonated by an unauthorized person.”123 
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2. Site Security. The goal of this measure would be to prevent unauthorized access 
or removal of sensitive nuclear material from nuclear sites. CTR could offer the 
lessons learned from the U.S. and Russian experiences protecting their respective 
nuclear arsenal. 
3. Material Security. This would be an approach to protecting and securing actual 
material, not just the site this material is contained within. The U.S. Department 
of Energy’s Material Protection, Control, & Accounting program has almost a 
decade of experience which could be advantageous in aiding the security of the 
various other nations’ nuclear material. 
4. Personnel Security. This is the prevention of “brain drain” by providing financial 
incentives to scientists to keep them from selling their expertise. The CTR has 
worked in conjunction with international science centers to “provide secure jobs, 
interesting work, and an awareness of or commitment to nonproliferation. 
Programs could also establish a database of relevant scientists in certain states, 
either to target funding or to track their activities.”124  
 
Another source of indispensable importance to the prevention of nuclear 
proliferation is the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). This treaty is currently 
undergoing a conference review in New York City. Leading up to this particular 
conference there have been a myriad of points of view about how this treaty conference 
may turn out. The concerns leading up to this conference have been the possible reaction 
of the United States regarding, not only the rising fear of international terrorism with 
nuclear capabilities, but the international pressure to enforce the NPT’s articles IV, V, 
and VI. These articles state respectively, that nations have the right to engage in exchange 
of technology, expertise, materials, and scientific information for the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy; that non-weapon states party to the treaty have access to peaceful 
applications of nuclear explosions; and that all nations have the obligation to adhere to 
the cessation of nuclear arms to a degree of total disarmament.125 Former President of the 
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United States, Jimmy Carter, wrote in an article for the Washington Post, 28 March 2005, 
“renewal talks for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are scheduled for May, yet the 
United States and other nuclear powers seem indifferent to its fate. This is remarkable, 
considering the addition of Iran and North Korea as states that either possess or seek 
nuclear weapons programs. A recent United Nations report warned starkly: "We are 
approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become 
irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation."”126 He further asserted that, “The 
United States is the major culprit in this erosion of the NPT. While claiming to be 
protecting the world from proliferation threats in Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, 
American leaders not only have abandoned existing treaty restraints but also have 
asserted plans to test and develop new weapons, including anti-ballistic missiles, the 
earth-penetrating "bunker buster" and perhaps some new "small" bombs. They also have 
abandoned past pledges and now threaten first use of nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear states.”127 His claims are not without substance, for example, the Bush 
Administration announced in December 2001 the withdrawal of the United States from 
the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In addition, several developments in the recent 
years have lead many nonproliferation experts and NPT party nations to assert that the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime needs to be bolstered: the discovery of the A.Q. Khan 
nuclear black market network; Iran’s unreported nuclear activities, including secret 
uranium enrichment facilities; the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in April 
2003; and the discovery of Libya’s covert nuclear weapons program, renounced in 
December 2003. “Brazilian Ambassador Sergio Duarte, who will chair the May Review 
Conference, suggested that the main difficulty facing the review conference will be how 
to balance a perceived need for greater controls with treaty provisions that ensure the 
right to peaceful applications of nuclear technology.”128 However, there are some that 
claim these five year review conferences are no longer essential to the efficacy of the 
NPT because the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995. Keeping with this view point, 
                                                 
126 Jimmy Carter, “Saving Nonproliferation,” Washington Post, 28 March 2005, pp. 1.On-line 
database, available at:  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5754-2005Mar27.html 
127 Ibid. pp. 2. 
128 Sharon Squassoni, “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: Issues for 
Congress,” CRS Report for Congress (RL32857), 16 may 2005, pp. 2. 
80 
the outcome of this review conference will be irrelevant; the NPT will stand or fall on its 
own merits. However, the issues and topics that are most likely to permeate this 
conference will be the requirement dictated by the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, 
Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) to ensure further action by the 
five declared nuclear states on disarmament issues; agreement by participants on an 
agenda for the conference; and the congruence of action by the five declared nuclear 
states on the myriad of issues to include peaceful use of nuclear technology and 
prevention of nuclear proliferation by rogue states (Iran and North Korea) and terrorist 
organizations.129 The overall goal of this conference, whether it proves to be efficacious 
or not, will be to strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime.  
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace created a “blueprint” for the 
strengthening of the international Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in a study released in 
March 2005 titled, Universal Compliance. This report incorporated inputs from experts 
and officials from the United States and twenty other nations across Europe, the Middle 
East, Asia, Russia, and the former Soviet States. In order to effectively bolster the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and commit to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty’s 
articles, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace created an “effective strategy 
for nuclear security” which will require “universal compliance with the norms and rules 
of a toughened nuclear nonproliferation regime. Compliance means more than 
declarations of good intent—it means actual performance. Universal means that 
nonproliferation norms and rules must be extended not only to treaty members, but also 
to all states and to non-state actors. Six obligations form the core of the universal 
compliance strategy. Together, they form a balance of obligations among the nuclear and 
non-nuclear states, and erect a defense-in-depth against the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Nearly one hundred policy recommendations flow from these obligations, of which 
twenty form the priority action agenda.”130 These six core obligations are: 
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1. Make nonproliferation irreversible. Tighten rules and restriction around the 
production of fissile material and withdrawal from the NPT.131 
2. Devalue the political and military currency of nuclear weapons. This requires 
nations to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies and 
international politics. Additionally, this obligation will require declared nuclear 
weapon states to ascribe to steady and verifiable disarmament of nuclear 
arsenals.132 
3. Secure all nuclear material. This will require all states to maintain vigorous 
standards for securing, monitoring, and accounting for fissile material in order to 
prevent nuclear terrorism and create the potential for secure nuclear 
disarmament.133 
4. Stop illegal transfers. This requires nations to stem the possibility of scientific 
know-how, technologies, and material from being sold or bargained for by other 
states, non-state actors, or corporations.134 
5. Commit to conflict resolution. Concentrate the diplomatic efforts of major 
powers in order to help solve regional conflicts which may provide incentive for 
regional hegemons search for security under the nuclear capabilities 
umbrella.135 
6. Solve the three-state problem. This involves addressing acceptance of the NPT 
by Pakistan, Israel, and India.136 
To elucidate the sheer numbers associated with the nuclear issue and to further 
highlight the potential for nuclear proliferation, not only from the five declared nuclear 
states, but from the nations in the few unstable regions of the world, the following table 
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succinctly highlights the current and former nations with nuclear weapons and/or nuclear 
programs. 
 
Figure 2.   Countries with Nuclear Weapons or Programs, Past and Present137 
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This table shows that there are thirty-five nations who have or have had nuclear 
weapons and/or nuclear programs. It also helps to illustrate that we, in the global sense, 
have reached a crossroads regarding nuclear weapons and programs. The policies and 
cooperation that are implemented today will determine if the current nuclear downsizing 
trend will continue. The strengthening of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime is a good 
starting point from which further cooperation, nuclear nonproliferation policies, and 
disarmament initiatives can thrive so as to continue reducing the world’s nuclear weapons 
and weapons programs. Furthermore, globalizing the U.S.-Russian collaborative effort 
within the Cooperative Threat Reduction program can provide structure and a framework 
from which other suspect nations can be approached and effectively deterred from 
producing or acquiring nuclear weapons or fissile material. In conjunction with the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Bush Administration’s push for the 
Proliferation Security Initiative will aid in curtailing the possibility of nuclear terrorism 
by blocking illicit transfers of sensitive material and bringing international attention to 
export control mechanisms. Furthermore, a move to strengthen international laws, 
treaties, and agreements while offering monetary and other aid incentives may provide 
alternative motivations for nations to abandon their nuclear weapons desires; and at the 
same time, these incentives could offer options and possible gainful employment to 
scientific and technology experts to keep them from selling their abilities to rogue states 
or terrorist organizations.  
In conclusion, the end result requires a comprehensive approach to coordinating 
the current and future policies, programs, and agreements to ensure that threat reduction 
and arms elimination continues between the United States and Russia. Moreover, the 
globalization of these programs and policies can help to advance nuclear nonproliferation 
efforts in order to secure the world’s nuclear weapons and material. This will result in 
further coordination to aid in preventing nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist 
organizations. Programs, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, and policy reviews, such as the Universal Compliance: A 
Strategy for Nuclear Security, put out by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace provide examples of how initially structured localized aid to ensure nuclear 
nonproliferation can evolve into international action to further drive threat reduction and 
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arms elimination programs. The relative brief history of threat reduction and arms 
elimination has entered a new era post September 11, 2001, and the action needed now 
requires the thwarting of international nuclear proliferation, while concomitantly 
coordinating the existing treaties and agreements to further cultivate and promote a 
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